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CARRIED INTEREST AND BEYOND: THE NATURE 
OF PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTMENT AND ITS 
INTERNATIONAL TAX IMPLICATIONS 
Young Ran (Christine) Kim* 
Private equity funds (PEFs) eliminate entity-level taxation by using 
pass-through entities. They further minimize their investors’ tax liability by 
taking the position that profits distributed to both general partners (GPs) and 
limited partners (LPs) are passive portfolio investment income and taxed 
preferentially. The taxation of carried interest at low capital gains rates is 
likely the most infamous loophole. This article challenges such tax position 
and instead argues that the nature of PEF investment is active. PEFs seek to 
influence their portfolio companies to increase their value so that they 
actively manage the companies by acquiring at least 10% of their stock, 
which does not conceptually accord with portfolio investments. The proposed 
theory that PEFs are active is further supported by recent proposals on 
carried interest as well as cases and rulings holding that PEFs are involved 
in a “trade or business.” 
This article also considers international tax implications of the new 
theory: it switches the primary tax jurisdiction to levy tax on PEFs’ cross-
border income. This change may be justified for GPs who erode the tax base 
of a source country, but less justified for LPs because of their genuinely 
passive involvement, notwithstanding that LPs’ tax-exempt or nonresident 
status enables GPs’ abusive activities. Finally, determining the true nature 
of PEF investment and reforming PEF tax accordingly would increase 
worldwide revenue without significantly reducing the revenue of traditional 
residence countries, because the traditional residence countries, such as the 
United States, are also major source countries in the PEF industry. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
Private equity funds (PEFs) essentially eliminate entity-level taxation, 
which would have occurred had it used a C corporation to pool and invest the 
capital, by taking the form of pass-through entities, particularly a limited 
partnership.1 In addition to enjoying partnership tax, PEFs further take the 
traditional position that profits distributed from the partnership vehicle to 
both general partners (GPs) and limited partners (LPs) are passive investment 
incomes, such as capital gains.2Since the flexibility of partnership tax allows 
for the difference in allocation of partnership profits and the underlying 
ownership of the partnership interest,3 the PEF market has an established 
practice of allocating 20% of profits, as carried interest, to GPs as a reward 
for their service to the fund on top of the return to their capital interest.4 
Carried interest has been called the most famous tax loophole of PEFs,5 
allowing private equity firms to pay tax on their income at lower capital gains 
rates. Recent proposals for carried interest suggest recasting the carried 
interest portion of a GP’s profit from capital gains to ordinary income, 
specifically as compensation for services of the GP.6 These proposals have 
been circulating for many years,7 and they have gained bipartisan support. In 
fact, reforming the tax treatment of carried interest was one of the few issues 
that both then-candidates Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump agreed upon 
during the 2016 presidential election.8 However, although the Trump 
 
 1 DONALD J. MARPLES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS2269, TAXATION OF HEDGE FUND 
AND PRIVATE EQUITY MANAGERS 2 (2014). 
 2 Id. at 5. 
 3 See I.R.C. § 704(b) (providing that a partner’s distributive share of income and 
distribution may be different from the partner’s interest in the partnership if the partnership 
agreement provides as such); RICHARD M. LIPTON ET AL., PARTNERSHIP TAXATION 121 (3d ed. 
2012) (explaining that I.R.C. § 704(b) allows flexibility for determining partners’ allocable 
share of partnership income and distributions). 
 4 Victor Fleischer, Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership Profits in Private Equity 
Funds, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 3 (2008). 
 5 Victor Fleischer, The Top 10 Private Equity Loopholes, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 15, 2013, 
https://dealbook.nytimes.com/2013/04/15/the-top-10-private-equity-loopholes/?_r=0. 
 6 See infra text accompanying notes 185–200. 
 7 Congress started discussing the issue in 2007. See Steven M. Rosenthal, Taxing 
Private Equity Funds as Corporate “Developers,” 138 TAX NOTES 361, 361 (2013). 
 8 Melissa Mittelman, With Close Trump Ties, Private Equity Eyes Tax, Financial 
Reform, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Jan. 19, 2017, https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-
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administration first sought to close the carried interest loophole in the recent 
tax reform,9 the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 did not effectively close the 
loophole.10 
Carried interest is not the only tax technique that a taxpayer may use to 
minimize tax burden. A recent article addressing private equity’s “tax game” 
of using 2% management fees and expense deductions illustrates other ways 
to reduce tax liability and suggests how to correct the issue.11 
More fundamentally, the discussion on carried interest and management 
fees raises questions about the nature of investments in private equity.12 
Traditionally, investors in PEFs are treated as passive investors, as opposed 
to active investors who manage and control the business to generate business 
profits. Thus, fund investors (both GPs and LPs) have been treated as 
portfolio investors, who are not involved in the business operation but simply 
receive passive income from their investment. International finance and tax 
policy literature agrees with this view and classifies cross-border investments 
by PEFs as foreign portfolio investments.13 
However, this article argues that such a view is at odds with the true 
nature of PEF investment: PEFs seek to influence their portfolio companies 
in order to increase their value, so that the PEFs actively manage and operate 
the portfolio companies by acquiring at least 10% of the stock of the portfolio 
companies.14 Given that the foreign portfolio investment refers to the 
 
01-19/with-close-trump-ties-private-equity-eyes-tax-financial-reform. 
 9 Rebecca Shabad, Trump Says His Administration Is Targeting Carried Interest 
Loophole in Tax Reform, CBS NEWS, May 1, 2017, http://www.cbsnews.com/news/trump-
says-his-administration-is-targeting-carried-interest-loophole-in-tax-reform/. 
 10 The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 applies a three-year holding period in order for 
investment managers to enjoy long-term capital gains rates on carried interest. Pub. L. No. 
115-97, § 13309, 131 Stat. 2054, 2130 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 1061(a)(2)). However, 
in many cases the effect is not likely material because private equity funds often hold 
investments longer than three years before realizing gains. Jason Factor & Meyer Fedida, Tax 
Cuts & Jobs Act: Considerations for Funds, CLEARY GOTTLIEB ALERT MEMORANDUM (Jan. 2, 
2018), https://www.clearygottlieb.com/~/media/organize-
archive/cgsh/files/2017/publications/tax-cuts-and-jobs-act-2017/updates-1-2-18/tcja-
summary—private-equity-jan-2.pdf. For further discussion, see infra Part IV.A. 
 11 See Gregg D. Polsky, A Compendium of Private Equity Tax Games (U.N.C. Legal 
Stud., Res. Paper No. 2524593, Nov. 14, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com 
/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2524593. 
 12 See, e.g., Rosenthal, supra note 7. 
 13 See, e.g., PETER CORNELIUS, INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENTS IN PRIVATE EQUITY: ASSET 
ALLOCATION, MARKETS, AND INDUSTRY STRUCTURE 155 (2011); infra text accompanying note 
146. 
 14 See, e.g., JACK S. LEVIN & DONALD E. ROCAP, STRUCTURING VENTURE CAPITAL, 
PRIVATE EQUITY AND ENTREPRENEURIAL TRANSACTIONS 1–3, 1–6 (2013) (providing that 
PEFs’ active involvement in managing portfolio companies distinguish PEFs from other types 
of investing). 
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investment owning less than 10% of the foreign entity to indicate its passive 
nature,15 the nature of PEF investment does not conceptually accord with that 
of portfolio investment. Carried interest proposals signal a challenge to the 
traditional position for GPs in tax law by admitting their active involvement 
in the investment. Moreover, the recent Sun Capital case decided in the First 
Circuit16 and an Internal Revenue Service (Service) ruling,17 which held that 
private equity is involved in a “trade or business,” the term of art describing 
active business in tax law, further complicates the traditional view of private 
equity investments as passive investments. 
The concerns that PEFs are abused to minimize the tax liability of private 
equity firms and investors18 need more attention in the context of recent 
developments. Business income that used to be earned from C corporations 
has been shifted to pass-through entities over the last two decades, and the 
United States has likely lost substantial tax revenue due to such changes in 
the origin of business income.19 Business activity from pass-through entities 
was low in 1980, when pass-through entities produced only 20.7% of all 
business income, and had more than doubled to 54.2% by 2011.20 
However, discourse on private equity tax is still limited to domestic 
matters. There is scant research analyzing international tax aspects of PEFs’ 
cross-border investment, despite the dramatic increase in international capital 
flows. Indeed, PEFs invest all over the world. American private equity houses 
were in charge of 32% of international buyout investments between 2003 and 
2007.21 During the same period, 34% of the investments from the European 
private equity market were deployed in nondomestic countries.22 Recent 
proposals on carried interest and the challenge to the traditional tax position 
of PEFs as passive investors have significant implications for international 
tax as well, one of which could be changes the primary tax jurisdictions 
among relevant countries. 
 
 15 The Internal Revenue Code (Code) assumes that the dividing line between foreign 
direct investment and foreign portfolio investment is 10% of the investee entity. See infra Part 
III.B. 
 16 Sun Capital Partners III LP v. New England Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension 
Fund, 724 F.3d 129 (1st Cir. 2013). For more discussion on the Sun Capital case, see infra 
Part IV.B.2. 
 17 I.R.S. Chief Couns. Mem. 201501013 22 (Jan. 2, 2015), http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
wd/201501013.pdf. For more discussion, see infra Part V.C.1. 
 18 See, e.g., MARPLES, supra note 1, at 5 (indicating that current tax treatment harms 
horizontal equity between fund managers and other taxpayers); Fleischer, supra note 5. 
 19 Michael Cooper et al., Business in the United States: Who Owns It and How Much 
Tax Do They Pay 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. W21651, 2015), 
https://ideas.repec.org/h/nbr/nberch/13689.html. 
 20 Id. 
 21 ELI TALMOR & FLORIN VASVARI, INTERNATIONAL PRIVATE EQUITY 8 (2011). 
 22 Id. 
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Since the 1920s, countries have reached a consensus in international tax 
to allocate the primary tax jurisdiction of active business income to source 
countries where the income is produced and allocate the passive or portfolio 
income to residence countries.23 According to this consensus, a GP’s income, 
such as carried interest, and an LP’s income are both subject to the residence 
country’s primary tax jurisdiction.24 However, the policy alternatives 
recognizing the active nature of PEF investment would treat the income of 
GPs and LPs as active income, subject to the source country’s primary tax 
jurisdiction, thus strengthening source-based taxation.25 This article asserts 
that a change that strengthens the source-based taxation in international tax 
may be justified for a GP’s income, because a GP actively erodes the tax base 
of source country by converting the character of income (carried interest) as 
well as eroding the tax base of portfolio companies (via management fee 
waiver and expense allocation).26 On the other hand, an LP’s income would 
be subject to source-based taxation for being active, because a GP’s active 
performance is attributable to the fund under the laws of partnership and 
partnership tax.27 Furthermore, an LP’s tax-exempt or nonresident status is 
essential to enable a GP’s abusive activities. Nonetheless, strengthening 
source-based taxation on an LP’s income may be less justified considering 
its genuinely passive involvement in PEF investments. Thus, this article 
urges policymakers to consider both the public goods that LPs may provide 
and the alternative perspective challenging the tax consequences of LPs when 
deciding the proper partnership tax rule for LPs in PEF investment. 
It might be tempting to think that since recent discourse on policy 
alternatives suggests changing a portion of partners’ income from passive to 
active, there would be a revenue loss for residence countries with primary tax 
jurisdiction for passive income and a revenue gain for source countries with 
primary tax jurisdiction for active business income. Given that the United 
States is a major residence country like other developed countries,28 this 
 
 23 Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Structure of International Taxation: A Proposal for 
Simplification, 74 TEX. L. REV. 1301, 1306 (1996); Michael J. Graetz & Itai Grinberg, Taxing 
International Portfolio Income, 56 TAX L. REV. 537, 556–75 (2003); Michael J. Graetz & 
Michael M. O’Hear, The “Original Intent” of U. S. International Taxation, 46 DUKE L.J. 1021, 
1023, 1066–89 (1997). For more discussion on the allocation of international tax jurisdictions, 
see infra text accompanying notes 161–63. 
 24 Avi-Yonah, supra note 23; Graetz & Grinberg, supra note 23; Graetz & O’Hear, 
supra note 23. 
 25 See infra Part V. 
 26 See infra Part V.A.1. 
 27 See infra text accompanying notes 233–40. 
 28 Michael J. Graetz, David R. Tillinghast Lecture Taxing International Income: 
Inadequate Principles, Outdated Concepts, and Unsatisfactory Policies, 54 TAX L. REV. 261, 
264 (2001) (noting that the United States could be simply viewed as a capital exporting country 
(“residence country” in international tax terminology) in the 20th century but not if it is both a 
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could raise the concern that tax reform of private equity could reduce U.S. 
tax revenue if it expands to the international context. This article 
demonstrates, however, that tax reform of private equity would not 
significantly reduce the revenue of traditional residence countries, and yet it 
would significantly increase the revenue of source countries, thus increasing 
total worldwide revenue. Finally, since the United States is the biggest source 
country as well as the major residence country in the PEF industry,29 
determining the true nature of PEF investments and reforming PEF tax 
accordingly would not harm the United States’s revenue domestically or 
internationally. 
In sum, this article analyzes international tax implications of recent tax 
reforms and rulings on private equity. Part II describes the growth and 
globalization of PEFs. Part III argues that PEFs cannot be treated as pure 
passive investments due to the hybrid nature of their investment activity, 
which has the form of a passive investment, but is substantively active 
investment. However, the extent to which PEF investments should be treated 
as active is a difficult consideration. In order to understand the nature of PEF 
investments, tax scholars should compare other types of cross-border 
investments, thereby setting a new benchmark for taxing PEF investments. 
Part IV discusses the details of the alternatives to PEF taxation. In addition 
to the recent proposals on carried interest and management fees, a more 
ambitious position worth considering is to treat a PEF as a “trade or 
business.” Part V analyzes the international tax implications of the various 
proposals. Part VI demonstrates how the revenue of each country would be 
affected by the representative alternatives. Part VII concludes.  
II.  THE GROWTH AND GLOBALIZATION OF PEFS 
A.  Background of Private Equity 
Private equity has grown significantly over the last two decades.30 
Private equity is “responsible for up to a quarter of global M&A activity and 
as much as half of the leveraged loan issues in the capital markets,”31 and 
 
large capital importer (“source country” in international tax terminology) and capital 
exporter). 
 29 See infra Part II.C. 
 30 A partner at Texas Pacific Group, which ranked 5th in 2014 in The Private Equity 
International 300’s top 50 list, PRIVATE EQUITY INTERNATIONAL, The PEI 300 2014 (2014) 
[hereinafter PEI 300 2014], described the newsworthy feature of private equity deals as 
follows: “You can’t pick up the paper or turn on the TV and not hear about [private 
equity] . . . .” Andrew Ross Sorkin, Of Private Equity, Politics and Income Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, 
Mar. 11, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/11/business/yourmoney/ 11deal.html. 
 31 TALMOR & VASVARI, supra note 21, at 3. 
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many commentators now call it a “new industry.”32 However, because of the 
private nature of the market, “it is extremely challenging for the outsider to 
understand and form a view on the workings of the industry.”33 
The name “private equity” refers to investments in securities which are 
not usually listed in the public markets.34 In fact, a raison d’être of the private 
equity industry is that it allows companies to access capital that is not 
available on the public market for various reasons.35 On the flip side, 
investors in PEFs have a propensity to pursue relatively “high risk and high 
illiquidity” investments in a market that is currently lightly-regulated.36 
Generally, PEFs are divided into two categories: buyout funds and 
venture capital funds. Both buyout funds and venture capital funds share 
similar investment structures, using special purpose funds (or limited 
partnerships) which are established for a particular investment opportunity 
with a finite life.37 Investment strategies for buyout funds and venture capital 
funds, on the other hand, are quite different. Buyout funds’ targets are mostly 
“established and matured companies.”38 They raise funds through both debt 
and equity financing, and they are larger in size than venture capital funds. 
Venture capital funds focus on “startups, young and high-growth 
companies”39 and do not use debt capital financing. But for both funds, the 
general partners or managers of the funds take an active role in the operation 
of portfolio companies, often taking seats on the board of portfolio companies 
to execute and monitor their business strategies.40 Usually, when successful, 
a PEF exits a portfolio company after three to seven years.41 
The origin of private equity dates back to the 1930s and 1940s, when 
wealthy families started investing in venture capital firms.42 In the 1980s, 
 
 32 Id.; see also Robert Cressy, Federico Munari & Alessandro Malipiero, Playing to 
Their Strengths? Evidence that Specialization in the Private Equity Industry Confers 
Competitive Advantage, 13 J. CORP. FIN. 647, 648 (2007). 
 33 TALMOR & VASVARI, supra note 21, at 21. 
 34 Id. at 4. 
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. 
 37 Id. at 21. 
 38 Id. at 4. 
 39 Id. 
 40 Id.; see also LEVIN & ROCAP, supra note 14, at 1–3 (explaining that such active 
involvement significantly distinguishes PEFs from other types of investment, such as portfolio 
investments by a mutual fund or other money manager). 
 41 LEVIN & ROCAP, supra note 14, at 1–3 
 42 Wealthy families, such as the Rockefellers, Vanderbilts, and Bessemers, started 
investing in venture capital firms, such as J.H. Whitney & Company and American Research 
& Development Corporation. Since small business investment companies (SBICs) were 
licensed in 1958, venture capital became very popular in the 1960s, resulting in the 
development of limited liability partnerships (LLPs). The big boost for venture capital took 
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today’s big private equity firms43 started acquiring companies with leverage 
financing. By the late 1980s, private equity had emerged as a major asset 
class but became notorious for its leveraged buyouts of famous companies.44 
Private equity has subsequently experienced three major waves of 
expansions,45 followed by the global financial crisis in 2008. 
The aftermath of the global financial crisis affected the private equity 
industry as well. Because private equity is private in nature, it has been 
exempted from many regulatory oversight procedures, such as reporting and 
registration with financial regulators.46 However, two recent statutes — the 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 201047 in 
the United States and the Directive on Alternative Investment Fund 
Managers48 in Europe — now place additional requirements and restrictions 
on private equity, and more transparency is expected in the industry.49 
B.  Economics, Governance, Operation, and Basic Tax Issues 
The basic structure of a PEF is illustrated in Figure 1 below. PEFs are 
typically organized as one or more limited partnerships,50 established for the 
 
place in the 1970s because of the reduction of capital gains tax and the enactment of the 
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) by permitting pension funds to invest in 
PEFs. TALMOR & VASVARI, supra note 21, at 5. 
 43 The first of today’s big private equity firms, Warburg Pincus, came up in the late 
1960s. Id. Another large private equity firm today, Thomas Lee Partners, was founded in 1974 
and Kohlberg Kravis Roberts (KKR) was founded in 1978. Warburg Pincus is ranked at 
fourteenth and KKR at second in PEI 300 2014. PEI 300 2014, supra note 30. 
 44 When KKR bought the Safeway Stores in 1986, it borrowed 97% of $4.8bn that the 
deal cost. TALMOR & VASVARI, supra note 21, at 6. For more history written by journalists 
about how the private equity started, see DAVID CAREY & JOHN E. MORRIS, KING OF CAPITAL: 
THE REMARKABLE RISE, FALL, AND RISE AGAIN OF STEVE SCHWARZMAN AND BLACKSTONE 
(2012); JOSH KOSMAN, THE BUYOUT OF AMERICA: HOW PRIVATE EQUITY WILL CAUSE THE 
NEXT GREAT CREDIT CRISIS (2010). 
 45 The first expansion of private equity was in the 1980s with many high-yield junk 
bonds. The second expansion was in the 1990s with the dotcom technology bubble. And the 
third expansion was in the mid-2000s with the buyout boom and credit bubble. All three 
expansions collapsed when the relevant bubble burst. TALMOR & VASVARI, supra note 21, at 
6. 
 46 Id. at 13. 
 47 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 
§ 929-Z, 124 Stat. 1376, 1871 (2010) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 780). 
 48 Council Directive 2011/61, 2011 O.J. (L 174) 1. 
 49 TALMOR & VASVARI, supra note 21, at 13–14. 
 50 LEVIN & ROCAP, supra note 14, at 1–13 (explaining that the choice of a partnership or 
LLC is to avoid entity-level taxation). The U.S.-based PEFs are commonly registered in 
Delaware as LPs, but some are registered in Cayman Islands or Bermuda. TALMOR & VASVARI, 
supra note 21, at 27. The U.K. based PEFs are commonly registered in Jersey or Guernsey. 
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specific purpose of raising investment.51 In the early days of PEF investment, 
LPs were usually individuals. Now, LPs are largely institutional investors, 
such as pension funds, university endowments, financial institutions (mostly 
insurance companies), sovereign wealth funds, and high net-worth 
individuals.52 Retail investors cannot access private equity investments 
unless they invest in listed private equity funds,53 so the number of limited 
partners per private equity investment is typically smaller compared to that 
of mutual funds. LPs are mostly tax-exempt organizations and thus provide 
important tax planning opportunities for PEFs.54 Investors become LPs by 
making a “commitment” of a certain sizable amount of capital to the 
partnership, which is “a legally binding promise to deliver [their] pro rata 
share of the aggregate fund commitments as and when they are asked for” by 
GPs.55 
The private equity firms become GPs themselves or affiliates of GPs, 
responsible for all investment-related matters in PEFs.56 GPs typically make 
a small capital contribution, usually 1% to 5% of the fund’s capital,57 and 
promise management services in exchange for a “profit” (carried interest) in 
the partnership and “fees” (management fees).58 There is an industry standard 
practice, called “two and twenty:” 2% of the committed capital as an annual 
management fee and 20% of the fund’s future profit (or carried interest).59 
GPs can receive such carried interest after investors have received a priority 
 
 51 Rosenthal, supra note 7, at 361; see also TALMOR & VASVARI, supra note 21, at 21. 
 52 TALMOR & VASVARI, supra note 21, at 21–22; Fleischer, supra note 4, at 17–18. 
 53 TALMOR & VASVARI, supra note 21, at 21; Brian Cheffins & John Armour, The 
Eclipse of Private Equity, 33 DEL. J. CORP. L. 1, 5–6 (2008); David Cho, Firms Go Private in 
Search of Deeper Pockets, WASH. POST, Jan. 31, 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/01/30/AR2007013002038.html. 
 54 Fleischer, supra note 4, at 13–14, 17–18. 
 55 TALMOR & VASVARI, supra note 21, at 21–22. 
 56 Id. at 22. 
 57 Fleischer, supra note 4, at 8; Lily Batchelder, What Is Carried Interest and How 
Should It Be Taxed?, TAX POL’Y CTR.: BRIEFING BOOK (2012), 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/briefing-book/key-elements/business/carried-interest.cfm. 
 58 Rosenthal, supra note 7, at 361–62. 
 59 Fleischer, supra note 4, at 3. Such carried interest combined with the clawback 
provision gives a powerful financial incentive to GPs. See infra note 60 and accompanying 
text. 
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rate of return (or a hurdle rate),60 subject to a retrospective “clawback.”61 
PEFs acquire target companies or portfolio companies with capital 
received from LPs and GPs, and with debt-financing when they plan a 
leveraged buyout.62 Seeking control of the portfolio company and an active 
role in managing and operating the company, PEFs acquire “a very 
substantial equity stake”63 and/or appoint their employees to serve on the 
boards of the company.64 They then improve “the operations, governance, 
capital structure, and strategic position” of the portfolio company.65 From the 
beginning of their investments, PEFs have exit plans, either to resell the 
company or make an initial public offering.66 Income and sale proceeds 
arising from the exit are distributed to investors, rather than reinvested.67 The 
fund in most cases dissolves within eight to twelve years (the average being 
ten years, which reflects the expected lifetime of a given PEF).68 
 
 60 Until a fund’s return reaches a hurdle rate of return (e.g., 8%), the GP is not entitled 
to receive any profits from the fund, and all profits are allocated to LPs. However, once the 
fund’s return reaches the hurdle rate, profits are allocated disproportionately between the GP 
and LPs until the GP receives 20% of carried interest had they received the profits of the fund 
from the first dollar. Once the GP’s carried interest is satisfied, the remaining profits going 
forward are allocated between the GP and LPs according to their capital interests in the fund. 
Fleischer, supra note 4, at 22. 
 61 The clawback provision requires the individual partners of the PEF to return 
distributions to the extent of any subsequent losses in other investments of the fund, so that 
the GP never obtains profits more than its designated portion (e.g., 20%) of profits. It makes 
the GP share in the downside of the investment so that the GP’s retention of a carried interest 
functions as “both a risk-sharing mechanism and as an incentive . . . .” Carried Interest (Part 
II): Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Fin., 110th Cong. 3 (2007)[hereinafter Rosenblum] 
(statement of Bruce Rosenblum, Chairman of the Bd. of the Private Equity Counsel) 
http://www.finance.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/073107testbr.pdf; Andrew W. Needham, A 
Guide to Tax Planning for Private Equity Funds and Portfolio Investments, May 20, 2002 TAX 
NOTES 1256, 1228 (2002). 
 62 LEVIN & ROCAP, supra note 14, at 1–8, 1–10. 
 63 See Rosenblum, supra note 61, at 3 (testifying that “[a PEF] usually maintains a very 
substantial equity stake in the company and continues to take an active role in improving the 
company’s performance”). 
 64 LEVIN & ROCAP, supra note 14, at 1–3, 1–6. It is a common practice, as seen in the 
Sun Capital and Loan Star Fund cases, to appoint the GP’s employee to the board of the 
portfolio company. 
 65 Rosenblum, supra note 61; Rosenthal, supra note 7, at 362 n.7. 
 66 LEVIN & ROCAP, supra note 14, at 1–4; Rosenthal, supra note 7, at 362. 
 67 LEVIN & ROCAP, supra note 14, at 1–12, 1–13. 
 68 HARRY CENDROWSKI ET AL., PRIVATE EQUITY: HISTORY, GOVERNANCE, AND 
OPERATIONS 7 (2d ed. 2012); Rosenthal, supra note 7, at 36. 
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FIGURE 1.  STRUCTURE OF A BASIC PRIVATE EQUITY INVESTMENT69 
 
 The fundamental tax objective of PEF investments is to avoid entity-
level taxes by using a partnership or pass-through entity.70 This way, PEFs 
are treated as passive investors, not engaging in active business,71 and the 
income generated by selling the securities of portfolio companies are treated 
as long-term capital gains.72 This income then flows through to partners, and 
the character determined at the entity level is preserved to partners because 
the partnership is a pass-through entity.73 
Tax scholars acknowledge that there is a significant issue with how to 
tax carried interest of GPs.74 While the management fee is treated as ordinary 
income, there are disagreements over the character of carried interest.75 
Although current U.S. tax law treats the carried interest as capital gains, 
 
 69 Gregg D. Polsky, The Untold Story of Sun Capital: Disguised Dividends, 143 TAX 
NOTES 556, 558 (2014). 
 70 Needham, supra note 61, at 1219. 
 71 Brief of the Private Equity Growth Capital Council as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Appellees’ Petition for Panel Rehearing or Rehearing en banc, Sun Capital Partners III LP v. 
New England Teamsters & Trucking Industry Pension Fund, 724 F.3d 129 (1st Cir. 2013) (No. 
12-2312) [hereinafter Amicus Brief in Sun Capital case]. 
 72 I.R.C. §§ 1221, 1222. 
 73 I.R.C. § 702(b); Fleischer, supra note 4, at 15. 
 74 For articles addressing the issue, see, e.g., Batchelder, supra note 57; Chris 
Sanchirico, The Tax Advantage to Paying Private Equity Fund Managers with Profit Shares: 
What Is It? Why Is It Bad?, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 1071 (2008). 
 75 For articles suggesting treating carried interest as ordinary income, see, e.g., Fleischer, 
supra note 4, at 10–11; Karen C. Burke, The Sound and Fury of Carried Interest Reform, 1 
COLUM. J. TAX L. 1, 6 (2010). For articles endorsing current law, see, e.g., David A. Weisbach, 
The Taxation of Carried Interests in Private Equity, 94 VA. L. REV. 715 (2008). For articles 
suggesting a modified approach, see, e.g., Noel B. Cunningham & Mitchell L. Engler, The 
Carried Interest Controversy: Let’s Not Get Carried Away, 61 TAX L. REV. 121 (2008). 
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recognizing it as “a payout of a distributable share of partnership income,”76 
a number of proposals suggest reforming how carried interest is taxed by 
treating it instead as ordinary income.77 In addition, a recent reform proposal 
suggests that certain GP management fees and expense allocations should be 
treated as disguised dividends, effectively taxing this income as 
compensation.78 Part IV discusses these reforms in detail.79 
C.  The Globalization of PEFs and Their Regional Distribution 
 Notwithstanding the growing role of private equity in the international 
financial intermediation, it has been observed that the private equity industry 
has grown regionally, if not locally, “more or less in isolation, with 
differences in national legal and regulatory regimes, differential access to 
information and behavioral biases discouraging cross-border transactions.”80 
Since the 1990s, however, a globalization process began, led by U.S. GPs.81 
This subpart examines the representative jurisdictions of GPs and LPs 
(which correspond to residence country or home country), and destination 
market (which corresponds to source country or host country). This Subpart 
will show that (1) developed countries, such as the United States and the 
United Kingdom, are dominant source countries in PEF investment; (2) more 
than 90% of the GPs are located either in the United States or the United 
Kingdom; and (3), developed countries are also major regions for LPs. 
First, the United States is the largest destination market receiving private 
equity investment, absorbing 40.7% of private equity investment worldwide, 
followed by the United Kingdom and non-U.K. Europe.82 The Asia-Pacific 
region is the fourth largest destination market.83 Table 1 shows the ranks of 
both GPs’ jurisdictions and their destination markets. The share of the 
developing countries in the PEFs’ destination markets is not substantial 
compared to that of developed countries. 
Second, the United States is also ranked first in terms of GP jurisdiction, 
followed by the United Kingdom.84 The U.S. GPs account for 53% of 
 
 76 Fleischer, supra note 4, at 14–15. 
 77 Id. at 47–59. For more discussion on the carried interest, see infra text accompanying 
notes 181−200. 
 78 For more discussion on management fees, see infra text accompanying notes 201−06. 
 79 See infra Part IV. 
 80 CORNELIUS, supra note 13, at 139 (citing William L. Megginson, Toward a Global 
Model of Venture Capital?, 16.1 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 89 (2004)). 
 81 CORNELIUS, supra note 13, at 144. 
 82 Id. at 153–54. 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. 
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investment value worldwide, and the U.K. GPs account for 40%.85 Although 
the U.S. GPs tend to invest in the domestic market rather than invest offshore, 
they have been increasing offshore investment significantly.86 The U.S. GPs’ 
outward orientation was initially focused on the European market, and then 
expanded into other regions, such as Asia, Latin America, and the Middle 
East.87 The European market, being a mature market, has both attractive and 
unattractive features for U.S. GPs. It is a very competitive market, but it also 
has a substantial number of undervalued companies whose potential will 
bloom out “through superior governance, operational improvements, and 
financial leverage.”88 Just before the global financial crisis started in late 
2007, more than one-third of all European deals in terms of overall value 
involved U.S. buyout firms.89 More recently, U.S. firms have expanded into 
other regimes. The Asia-Pacific region is the world’s third largest private 
equity market, although its deal size is relatively small compared to that of 
mature markets.90 
European GPs have made considerable efforts to penetrate the U.S. 
market as well as emerging markets, especially in the Asia-Pacific and 
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) markets.91 However, on a net basis, 
Europe has been an importer of private equity capital, while the United States 
has been an exporter.92 The Asia-Pacific region is also a significant net 
importer of private equity capital.93 
Nonetheless, among European GPs, the United Kingdom should be 
treated differently based on the empirical evidence. As shown in Table 1, 
40% of the acquisitions made by all buyout PEFs in a study is made with 
U.K.-based funds.94 53% is managed by U.S.-based funds.95 Conversely, the 
United Kingdom absorbed only 22% of the overall amount of capital 
deployed.96 Thus, the United States and the United Kingdom are two key 
 
 85 Id. 
 86 Id. at 152 (comparing, for example, U.S.-based funds raised in late 1990s and early 
2000s and observing a significant increase in their investments in Europe). 
 87 CORNELIUS, supra note 13, at 157. 
 88 Id. at 144. 
 89 The most active investor in Europe is KKR, ranked second in PEI 300 2014. Id. at 
144; PEI 300 2014, supra note 30. 
 90 CORNELIUS, supra note 13, at 145−46. 
 91 Id. 
 92 Id. at 149. 
 93 Id. at 154. 
 94 Id. at 153–54. 
 95 Id. 
 96 Id. Cornelius seems to imply that the United Kingdom is a net exporter of capital by 
comparing 22% of global private equity capital invested in the United Kingdom. portfolio 
company with 40% of private equity capital deployed worldwide being managed by U.K.-
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jurisdictions of GPs, accounting for 93% of the private equity capital 
deployed worldwide. 
 
TABLE 1.  INVESTMENT VALUE BY ORIGIN OF GP AND DESTINATION 
MARKET97 
                                                                                       Recipient Country 
Investor 
Country 
United States 
United 
Kingdom 
Non-U.K. 
Europe 
Asia-Pacific 
Latin 
America 
Total 
 
€ 
billion 
% 
€ 
billion 
% 
€ 
billion 
% 
€ 
billion 
% 
€ 
billion 
% 
€ 
billion 
% 
United 
States 
37,398 72.7 4,098 8.0 5,865 11.4 2,520 4.9 1,542 3.0 51,424 
100 
(53)* 
United 
Kingdom 
2,194 5.7 17,266 44.6 19,101 49.3 168 0.4 - - 38,731 
100 
(40) 
Non-
U.K. 
Europe 
26 0.4 2 0.0 5,882 99.5 - - - - 5,909 
100 
(6) 
Asia-
Pacific 
83 5.6 - - - - 1,385 92.7 27 1.8 1,495 
100 
(1) 
Total 39,704 40.7 21,365 21.9 30,848 31.6 4,074 4.2 1,568 1.6 97,559 
100 
(100) 
 
Looking at the relationship between destination countries and GPs’ 
countries, of the capital exported by U.S. buyout funds, the largest (11.4%) 
was invested in non-U.K. Europe, followed by the U.K. (8.0%) and Asia 
(4.9%).98 By contrast, the Latin American market did not play a significant 
role for U.S.-based funds (3%).99 The U.K.-based funds invested heavily in 
non-U.K. European markets (49.3%) out of the capital deployed.100 For both 
U.S.-based and U.K.-based funds, the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) 
market did not show a meaningful number in the study. 
However, the data in Table 1 will need to be updated to fill in missing 
 
based funds. However, it is not clear whether the United Kingdom could be characterized as a 
net exporter of capital with this data, because 40% investment made by U.K.-based funds 
presumably relates to capital raised from all over the world. Nonetheless, it can be argued that 
the United Kingdom is “the most international market.” See id. at 154. 
 97 Id. at 153, Table 7.4. (data compiled from source table). In the table created by 
Cornelius, I added the percentage ratio (*) of the total invest amount of each investor country 
to the total invest amount of all countries in the parenthesis at the right first column. Cornelius 
relied on AlpInvest Partners’ proprietary database for this table, in which the sample includes 
102 buyout funds raised between 1995 and 2004. The AlpInvest Partners is a Dutch-based 
PEF, ranked at forty-ninth in PEI 300 2014. See PEI 300 2014, supra note 30. 
 98 CORNELIUS, supra note 13, at 153–54. 
 99 Id. at 154. 
 100 Id. at 153–54. 
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data from the recent decade. As shown in Table 2 and Figure 2, the Latin 
American market exceeds the net capital flows toward the non-U.K. 
European or CEE markets since 2009. Among emerging markets, Asia-
Pacific and Latin American markets are the most important capital importing 
regions. 
TABLE 2.  PEFS WITH REGIONAL FOCUS RAISED BY YEAR101 
 
USD (BILLION) 2007 2008 2009 
EMERGING ASIA 28.7 39.7 15.9 
CEE AND CIS 14.6 5.6 1.6 
LATIN AMERICA/CARIBBEAN 4.4 4.5 2.2 
MENA 5.3 6.9 1.1 
SUB-SAHARAN AFRICA 2.0 2.2 1.0 
MULTI-REGION 4.1 7.7 0.8 
EMERGING MARKET (NO. OF 
FUNDS WITH CLOSES) 
59.2 
(204) 
66.5 
(210) 
22.6 
(196) 
FIGURE 2.  NET CAPITAL FLOWS TO EMERGING ECONOMIES, BY REGION 
AND INVESTMENT TYPE102 
 
 
 101 TALMOR & VASVARI, supra note 21, at 60, Exhibit 4.1. (data compiled from source 
table). Talmor and Vasvari relied on many reports issued by Emerging Markets Private Equity 
Association for this table. Id. 
 102 Peter Cornelius, Financial Deepening, Private Equity and Capital Flows to Emerging 
Markets, 1 REV. PRIVATE EQUITY, 9, Fig. 11 (2011), http://alpinvest.com/ 
assets/pdfs/The_Review_of_Private_Equity_-_Volume_1_Issue_2.pdf. Cornelius relied on a 
report issued by the Institute of International Finance in 2011 to create this chart. Id. Although 
this data includes overall capital flows, including FDI and FPI, it can be a reference to show 
the time when the size of Latin American economy exceeds that of CEE. 
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FIGURE 3.  EMERGING MARKET PRIVATE CAPITAL INFLOWS, NET ($ 
BILLION)103 
 
Third, LPs’ jurisdictions are less known to the public. Although it is hard 
to find data on LPs’ regional distributions in global PEF investment, Preqin’s 
global database of data of LPs’ origin in the emerging market investment 
could work as a sample of the LPs’ jurisdictions for the broader investment 
region.104 As shown in Figure 4, the United States (38%) and Western Europe 
(30%) are the top two regions of 3542 LPs listed in the database in 2011.105 
 
 
 
 
 103 INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, CAPITAL FLOWS TO EMERGING MARKETS 1, 
Chart 1 (2014), http://iif.com/emr/capflows201405.php. 
 104 Talmor and Vasvari introduce Preqin database as follows: “Preqin, an independent 
data provider, offers one of the most comprehensive and detailed sources of private equity 
performance data covering both buyout and venture funds. Their statistics are based on data 
from a number of different sources, including from GPs themselves. This dataset covers over 
5,000 private equity funds of all types and a geographic focus that represents about 70% of all 
private equity capital committed worldwide” as of 2009. See TALMOR & VASVARI, supra note 
21, at 8–9. For more information, visit www.preqin.com. 
 105 Cornelius, supra note 102, at 10. 
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FIGURE 4.  EMERGING MARKET LPS, BY GEOGRAPHY106 
III.  THE NATURE OF PEF INVESTMENT IN THE CROSS-BORDER CONTEXT 
A.  Insufficient Study for PEFs 
 The international finance and tax policy literature has divided cross-
border transactions into two major categories: foreign direct investment 
(FDI)107 and foreign portfolio investment (FPI).108 With regards to certain 
challenges under the traditional international tax regime that we encounter 
 
 106 Id. at 10, Fig. 13. (data compiled from source table). Cornelius accessed the Preqin 
database on July 15, 2011, and asserted that only a small portion of LPs in the PEF investing 
in the emerging markets are headquartered in emerging markets, and a large portion of them 
are foreign. However, I use the same statistics to show that the United States and Western 
Europe are the top two regions for the origin of the LPs in the emerging markets. 
 107 FDI is defined as ownership of foreign investors of a controlling form, typically at 
least 10% of voting stock in the local investing entity. There is plenty of traditional 
international tax scholarship accumulated with regard to FDI, so that the examples of 
multinational enterprises are easily caught by international tax policy radar screen, attracting 
constant attention from public and academia. For more on FDI in general, see, e.g., Pol Antràs, 
Mihir A. Desai & C. Fritz Foley, Multinational Firms, FDI Flows, and Imperfect Capital 
Markets, 124 Q.J. ECON. 1171, 1171–219 (2009); Lars P. Feld & Jost H. Heckemeyer, FDI 
and Taxation: A Meta-Study, 25 J. ECON. SURV. 233, 233–272 (2011); Roger H. Gordon & 
James R. Hines Jr., International Taxation (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 8854, 2002), http://www.nber.org/ papers/w8854.pdf?new_window=1. 
 108 For more on FPI, see, e.g., DORON HERMAN, TAXING PORTFOLIO INCOME IN GLOBAL 
FINANCIAL MARKETS (2002); Avi-Yonah, supra note 23; Graetz & Grinberg, supra note 23; 
Yaron Z. Reich, Taxing Foreign Investors’ Portfolio Investments: Developments & 
Discontinuities, 98 TAX NOTE INT’L. 1975, 1976–1986 (1998) (focusing on inbound FPI). 
United States
1161
(38%)
Western Europe
907
(30%)
Other advanced 
economies 
487
(16%)
Emerging 
economies
487
(16%)
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when dealing with cross-border investments,109 both FDI and FPI have been 
the subject of extensive analysis. FDI is the most basic form of cross-border 
investment; corporations or individuals who directly invest in a foreign 
company with substantial ownership to influence the foreign company’s 
business decision are engaged in FDI. The multinational enterprises (MNEs), 
such as Google and Apple, which have their own affiliates all over the world, 
are major players in FDI.110 Since MNEs’ tax strategies constantly garner 
media coverage, plenty of resources in international tax are focused on this 
issue either to attack or to defend the MNEs’ strategy.111 
In addition, in the last decade, the public finance and tax law literature 
have started studying FPI as distinguished from FDI.112 Using the term FPI 
as the opposite concept of FDI, income arising from FPI or portfolio income 
usually refers to the passive investment income, such as dividends, interest, 
or capital gains. 
By contrast, there has been relatively little study of foreign indirect 
investments (FII),113 particularly the use of fund vehicles, notwithstanding 
the fact that they are of increasing economic importance. Recognizing a lack 
 
 109 A commentator described the current international tax regime as a “flawed miracle.” 
See Avi-Yonah, supra note 23, at 1303–04 (arguing that it is a miracle because “a coherent 
international tax regime exists” notwithstanding the fact that it is very hard to reach a 
consensus among sovereign states, but still flawed especially in two areas: one is FPI and the 
other is MNEs). 
 110 OECD, BENCHMARK DEFINITION OF FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT 14 (4th ed. 2008). 
 111 See generally Chris William Sanchirico, As American as Apple Inc.: International 
Tax and Ownership Nationality 1–3 n.1–6 (U. Pa. L. Sch. Pub. L. Res. Paper No. 14-5, U. Pa. 
Inst. L. & Econ. Res. Paper No. 14-3, 2014), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=2394227. In 
regard to Apple’s tax strategy, see, e.g., OFFSHORE PROFIT SHIFTING AND THE U.S. TAX CODE—
PART 2 (APPLE INC.) BEFORE THE PERM. SUBCOMM. ON INVESTIGATIONS OF THE SEN. COMM. ON 
HOMELAND SECURITY AND GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 113TH CONG., 152–91 (2013), 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CHRG-113shrg81657/html/CHRG-113shrg81657.htm; 
Charles Duhigg  & David Kocieniewski, How Apple Sidesteps Billions in Taxes, N.Y. TIMES, 
Apr. 28, 2012, http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/29/business/apples-tax-strategy-aims-at-
low-tax-states-and-nations.html. In regard to Google’s tax strategy, see, e.g., Edward D. 
Kleinbard, Stateless Income, 11 FLA. TAX REV. 699, 707–14 (2011), Jesse Drucker, Google 
2.4% Rate Shows How $60 Billion Lost to Tax Loopholes, BLOOMBERG NEWS, Oct. 21, 2010, 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-21/google-2-4-rate-shows-how-60-billion-u-s-
revenue-lost-to-tax-loopholes.html; Jesse Drucker, “Dutch Sandwich” Saves Google Billions 
in Taxes, BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK, Oct. 22, 2010, 
http://www.nbcnews.com/id/39784907/ns/business-us_business/t/dutch-sandwich-saves-
google-billions-taxes/. 
 112 See supra text accompanying note 1078. 
 113 In this article, “indirect investment” refers to an investment to pool capital for 
investment from multiple investors and to invest in the underlying assets through vehicles, 
such as funds, trusts, or other entities. It is commonly called a “fund investment” or “collective 
investment” in a rough sense, although these terms are not always used identically or 
consistently. See also infra Part III.C for more details. 
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of international tax rules dealing with indirect investment in international tax, 
the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD)114 
and the International Fiscal Association (IFA)115 have released several 
reports dealing with the application of tax treaties to FII mechanisms. 
However, the OECD and IFA reports limit the scope of their suggestions to 
mutual funds or collective investment vehicles (CIVs),116 and explicitly 
exclude “the issue of treaty entitlement with respect to investment through 
private equity funds, hedge funds or trusts or other entities” from their 
scope.117 Existing studies in the international tax field on fund investments 
also deal mostly with investment by mutual funds or CIVs only, to the 
exclusion of PEFs and similar vehicles.118 As a result, PEFs have been under-
studied, despite their significance, and the resulting gap in the literature has 
made tax authorities and taxpayers suffer from the lack of proper rules and 
policy for taxing cross-border investment by PEFs. 
Traditionally, the PEF industry has argued that PEFs are passive 
investors subject to the same rule as FPI.119 This part of the article argues 
 
 114 For OECD’s discussion, see OECD, TAXATION OF CROSS-BORDER PORTFOLIO 
INVESTMENT - MUTUAL FUNDS AND POSSIBLE TAX DISTORTIONS (1999); OECD, FIRST 
MEETING OF THE INFORMAL CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON THE TAXATION OF COLLECTIVE 
INVESTMENT VEHICLES, LONDON, 9–10–11 (2007); OECD, REPORT OF THE INFORMAL 
CONSULTATIVE GROUP ON THE TAXATION OF COLLECTIVE INVESTMENT VEHICLES AND 
PROCEDURES FOR TAX RELIEF FOR CROSS-BORDER INVESTORS ON THE GRANTING OF TREATY 
BENEFITS WITH RESPECT TO THE INCOME OF COLLECTIVE INVESTMENT VEHICLES (2009); 
OECD, R(24). THE GRANTING OF TREATY BENEFITS WITH RESPECT TO THE INCOME OF 
COLLECTIVE INVESTMENT VEHICLES, in MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND ON CAPITAL 
2010 1–34 (2012) [hereinafter CIV REPORT]. 
 115 For IFA’s discussion, see INT’L FISCAL ASSOC., Volume LXXIIB THE TAXATION OF 
INVESTMENT FUNDS : 51ST CONGRESS OF THE INTERNATIONAL FISCAL ASSOCIATION, NEW 
DELHI 1997 (1997). 
 116 Mutual funds are the equivalent concept of CIVs as the term is used in OECD 
literature, or of regulated investment companies (RIC) under the Code. See I.R.C. § 851(f)(1). 
These funds differ from private equity funds to the extent that the former are more open to the 
public, and are regulated by the government, while the latter are private, and are often not 
regulated by the government. 
 117 CIV REPORT, supra note 114, at R(24)–4. 
 118 See, e.g., TOMI VIITALA, TAXATION OF INVESTMENT FUNDS IN THE EUROPEAN UNION 
13 (2005). Viitala defines the term “investment fund” in his study to refer to CIVs within the 
scope of UCITS Directive of 1985: COUNCIL DIRECTIVE 85/611/EEC OF 20 DECEMBER 1985 
ON THE COORDINATION OF LAWS, REGULATIONS AND ADMINISTRATIVE PROVISIONS RELATING TO 
UNDERTAKINGS FOR COLLECTIVE INVESTMENT IN TRANSFERABLE SECURITIES. The UCITS 
Directive covers “only publicly-offered open-end investment funds which invest in 
transferable securities and money market instruments.” Id. at 2, n. 5. 
 119 See, e.g., Amicus Brief in Sun Capital case, Sun Capital, 724 F.3d 129 (1st Cir. 2013) 
(No. 12-2312). Many PEFs have historically relied on certain tax authorities, including the 
following two United States Supreme Court cases, to support the position that they are not 
engaged in a “trade or business” for federal income tax purposes: The first case is Higgins v. 
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that PEF investment should not be treated as purely passive because of the 
hybrid nature of its investment activity. However, to what extent private 
equity is active is a difficult question. Conceptualizing the nature of PEF 
investment by comparing other types of cross-border investment would help 
set a new benchmark for taxing PEF investment that should be aimed for in 
international tax. 
B.  Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) and Foreign Portfolio Investment 
(FPI): Active and Passive Distinction in International Tax 
 Before outlining the distinct features of PEFs in more detail, it will be 
useful to clarify some key terms used to characterize patterns of investment 
in the modern global economy. 
In a very general sense, the phrase “foreign direct investment” can be 
defined as “an investment made by a company or entity based in one country 
in a company or entity based in another country.”120 However, for public 
finance and tax law, FDI means more than just acquiring an ownership 
interest in a foreign company. The term “direct investment” usually refers to 
a long-term relationship between direct investors and investees in which the 
investors exercise a significant degree of influence and control over the 
investee, 121 and in which the investors typically acquire at least 10% of the 
investee entity.122 The Internal Revenue Code (Code) also assumes that the 
foreign investment is classified as direct (and thus treated as an FDI) when 
the investing entity owns at least 10% of the investee’s voting stock.123 
Two terms should be distinguished from FDI. First, the term “foreign 
indirect investment” refers to an investment mechanism that pools capital 
from multiple investors in order to invest in underlying assets through 
intermediary vehicles, such as CIVs or PEFs.124 It may acquire less than a 
 
Commissioner, 312 U.S. 212 (1941) and the second case is Whipple v. Commissioner, 373 
U.S. 193 (1963). 
 120 Investopedia, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (FDI) DEFINITION, 
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/f/fdi.asp. 
 121 OECD, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT OECD FACTBOOK 2013: ECONOMIC, 
ENVIRONMENTAL AND SOCIAL STATISTICS (2013), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/ 
sites/factbook-2013-en/04/02/01/index.html?itemId=/content/chapter/factbook-2013-34-en. 
 122 Gordon & Hines Jr., supra note 107, at 42; Graetz & Grinberg, supra note 23, at 539 
(acknowledging that the dividing line between direct and portfolio investment may be 
controversial, because some countries use a lower threshold ⸺ 5% or even 1% ⸺ in 
classifying investment as direct. However, it argues that some dividing line exists and 10% is 
the commonly used throughout the OECD). 
 123 See, e.g., Act of Aug. 16, 1954, Pub. L. No. 83−591, ch. 736, 68A Stat. 286 (codified 
as amended at I.R.C. § 902 (1954)), repealed by Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 
115–97, § 14301(a), 131 Stat. 2054, 2221. 
 124 A layperson might intuitively think that when the individual or corporation owns less 
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10% ownership in the investee entity, but not necessarily so. 
Second, the public finance and tax literature use the phrase “foreign 
portfolio investment” as the complementary concept to FDI.125 Like FDI 
investors, FPI investors invest in the securities of the investee company (such 
as stocks and bonds), but they generally are not particularly interested in the 
management of the investee company, and they typically do not own more 
than 10% of the voting stock.126 FPI is often accomplished using a vehicle 
such as a fund, but, again, no particular form is inherent to the definition of 
FPI. 
Further complication comes with the distinction between “active 
business income” and “passive income” in international taxation. The present 
consensus among international community allocates taxpayers’ active 
business income to the source jurisdiction, and passive or portfolio income 
to the residence jurisdiction.127 Many international tax scholars articulate the 
boundary between active and passive income as follows: active business 
income is derived from the economic activities of FDI, involving direct 
control over the local entity, while passive income (or portfolio income) is 
derived from activities which are not related to the exercise of direct control 
by the taxpayer.128 Active business income also corresponds to the income 
“effectively connected” with a U.S. “trade or business” under the Code,129 
and to the income attributable to a “permanent establishment” under tax 
treaties.130 
In essence, the concept of FDI is inherently linked with the acquisition 
and exercise of direct control over a target or investee entity, and it involves 
the receipt of active business income for tax purposes. By contrast, the notion 
 
than 10% of the voting stock in foreign entity, such an investment would be classified as FII. 
However, it is not the definition of FII. See infra Part III.C. 
 125 Graetz & Grinberg, supra note 23, at 539 (stating that “[i]nvestment is classified as 
portfolio when the individual or corporation owns less than 10% of the foreign entity”). 
 126 Investopedia, Foreign Portfolio Investment – FPI, https://www.investopedia.com/ 
terms/f/foreign-portfolio-investment-fpi.asp. For the ownership threshold of portfolio 
investment, see, e.g., Greatz & Grinberg, supra note 23, at 539. 
 127 Avi-Yonah, supra note 23, at 1306. 
 128 Id. at 1309–10 (recognizing that direct investors may earn passive income, such as a 
direct dividend, from FDI, in which case such dividend is treated differently from the passive 
portfolio dividend. Nonetheless, even such direct dividend is taxed primarily in the residence 
country of the direct investors. Thus, he reserves the term portfolio income for passive income 
which is not connected to the direct control). See also Graetz & Grinberg, supra note 23, at 
539–42 (often using passive investment and portfolio investment as synonym). 
 129 I.R.C. §§ 871(b), 882; see also Avi-Yonah, supra note 23, at 1318 (noting that the 
terms “trade or business” and “effective connected” are not defined in the Code, but it has 
been established that such terms refer to the active business operation by rulings and court 
precedents). 
 130 Avi-Yonah, supra note 23, at 1307. 
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of FPI connotes a more passive investment model, without direct control over 
the target entity, and it elicits passive or portfolio income for tax purposes. 
However, the term FPI has also traditionally been used to cover cross-border 
fund investment that I defined as FII, because FPI often uses intermediary 
vehicles.131 Nonetheless, using an intermediary is not conceptually necessary 
for FPI. Hence, this article will distinguish FII from FPI, and will use the 
term FPI to refer to a category of pure portfolio investment without using an 
intermediary, after showing how the term FPI has been analytically blurred 
with analysis of CIV and PEF in the next Subpart. 
C.  Foreign Indirect Investment (FII): PEF and Collective Investment 
Vehicle (CIV) 
As noted above, FII can be defined as an investment mechanism that 
pools capital from multiple investors through intermediary vehicles. FII may 
be further divided into two subcategories. The first category is variously 
described as mutual funds, regulated investment companies (RICs), or CIVs, 
regardless of what term is used,132 which are “subject to investor-protection 
regulation in the country in which they are established.”133 The second 
category includes a wide range of alternative investment vehicles in the 
international finance market with different investment objectives and 
organizational structures, such as PEFs or hedge funds.134 Since hedge funds 
are often included in the broad definition of PEFs, the second subcategory 
will usually refer to PEFs in this article.135 
 
 131 Investopedia, Foreign Investment Routes: The FDI and FPI, 
https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/012914/foreign-investment-routes-fdi-and-
fpi.asp. 
 132 See supra text accompanying note 116. 
 133 CIV REPORT, supra note 114, at 3. 
 134 For a comparison between hedge funds and mutual funds, see, e.g., Alan L. Kennard, 
The Hedge Fund Versus the Mutual Fund, 57 TAX L. 133 (2003). 
 135 I include hedge funds in the broad concept of PEFs in light of the wide spectrum of 
forms within the category of hedge funds. First, traditional hedge funds sought positive returns 
whether the market rose or fell by holding both long and short positions in their investments. 
The hedge funds sought profit by adjusting the ratio of long and short position according to 
prevailing and predicted market conditions. This “hedging” behavior prompted the name of 
the funds. Gain or loss of the hedge funds depended on inefficiencies in the market, not on 
whether the market is good or bad. The investment strategy heavily focusing on arbitrage is 
quite anomalous, and not a good business model to start thinking about the general tax reform. 
(For the tax issues and analysis of hedge funds, see Andrew W. Needham & Christina Brause, 
Hedge Funds, 736-2nd TAX MGMT. BNA U.S. INCOME PORTF., I.A. (2014).) However, today’s 
hedge funds are not market neutral any more, and instead employ investment strategy similar 
to that of private equity funds. In this regard, some literatures include hedge funds in the broad 
definition of private equity funds. See CENDROWSKI ET AL., supra note 68, at 4; Sanchirico, 
supra note 111, at 48. 
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The notion that FII is somehow more related to passive FPI than to FDI 
is in general only true for the first subcategory of FIIs (i.e., the CIVs). On the 
contrary, the investment objectives of PEFs, the second subcategory of FII, 
are not limited to passive investment but “cover the full spectrum of the 
market.”136 Nonetheless, existing studies of PEFs seem to focus on portfolio 
investment in general and do not distinguish PEFs in particular,137 resulting 
in an unfortunate analytical blurring of the two terms. 
As a matter of fact, PEFs typically seek to acquire control over — or at 
least significant positions in — a target company, acquiring at least 10% of 
the stock, because the PEF managers seek to influence the target company 
and change the capital structure optimally in order to increase its value, 
especially in the case of buyout funds.138 Hence, in terms of ownership ratio, 
PEFs typically involve a higher degree of control over portfolio companies 
than CIVs’ holdings in portfolio equities.139 In this respect, PEFs share a 
common feature with FDI. 
The extent to which PEF investment income should be treated as active 
income is somewhat controversial. Traditionally, the private equity industry 
has argued that PEFs are passive investors and partnership profits allocated 
to both GPs and LPs are passive income, because “making and deriving 
income from investments (in the form of income and capital gains), and 
paying professional managers to manage those investments does not 
constitute a ‘trade or business’ for purposes of the [Code].”140 However, 
recent proposals on carried interest envision that at least GP’s carried interest 
among partnership profits should be treated as ordinary income.141 
Furthermore, the recent ruling in the Sun Capital case by the U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the First Circuit, holding that the Sun Capital fund was engaged 
 
 136 Andrew W. Needham, Private Equity Funds, 735-2nd TAX MGMT. BNA U.S. INCOME 
PORTF., II.A.1. (2014). 
 137 See, e.g., CORNELIUS, supra note 13, at 155. By addressing the home bias issue in the 
fund investment both by mutual funds and by private equity, Cornelius criticizes the existing 
Survey of International Monetary Fund and U.S. Treasury, contending that both surveys are 
limited to FPI and does not include data of FDI. He further argues that this is an important 
shortcoming for his study on the private equity because PEFs are typically holding more than 
10% of the foreign company. Cornelius also criticizes the data capturing FDI in Philip R. Lane 
& Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti, The External Wealth of Nations Mark II: Revised and Extended 
Estimates of Foreign Assets and Liabilities, 1970–2004, 73 J. INT’L. ECON. 223 (2007) and 
Philip R. Lane & Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti, The Drivers of Financial Globalization, 98 AM. 
ECON. REV. 327 (2008), arguing that such data does not provide information on private equity 
either because it does not identify individual classes of foreign investors, such as private 
equity. Id. 
 138 TALMOR & VASVARI, supra note 21, at 4. 
 139 Id. 
 140 VIITALA, supra note 118, at 6. 
 141 See, e.g., Fleischer, supra note 4, at 57. 
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in a trade or business,142 broadens the tax agenda of activeness of PEF from 
the GP’s carried interest to the overall income of both GPs and LPs arising 
from the investment activity of PEFs.143 This issue will be further discussed 
in Part IV. 
Nevertheless, the traditional position — that not only CIVs but also PEFs 
are merely passive investors in portfolio companies and are not engaged in a 
“trade or business” — may explain the confusion that results from treating 
both CIVs and PEFs as a genre of portfolio investment (or FPI in cross-border 
transactions), notwithstanding the higher degree of control shown by many 
PEFs. 
However, since using an intermediary is not conceptually necessary for 
FPI, this article will distinguish FII from FPI. A similar distinction will be 
drawn between PEFs and CIVs: a PEF involves direct control while a CIV 
does not. 
D.  Conceptualizing the Hybrid Nature of PEF Investment 
The foregoing suggests that it is possible to distinguish FDI, FPI, PEFs, 
and CIVs along two conceptual axes: direct control vs. noncontrol, and 
traditional direct investment without intermediaries vs. indirect investment 
with intermediaries. A 2x2 matrix in Table 3 below shows how FDI, FPI, 
PEFs and CIVs are placed in each of the four squares. 
 
 142 Sun Capital Partners III LP v. New England Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension 
Fund, 724 F.3d 129 (1st Cir. 2013). See infra Part IV.B.2 for more discussion on the Sun 
Capital case. 
 143 Although the Sun Capital case involved the definition of the term trade or business 
for ERISA purposes only, “it is not a big leap to argue that the fund was engaged in a trade or 
business for tax purposes.” See Victor Fleischer, Sun Capital Court Ruling Threatens 
Structure of Private Equity, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 1, 2013, http://dealbook.nytimes.com/ 
2013/08/01/sun-capital-court-ruling-threatens-private-equity-structure/. Many practitioners 
are criticizing the Sun Capital case with the concern that it might change the tax treatment of 
PEFs adversely affecting the private equity industry. See Davis Polk, First Circuit Sun Capital 
Decision Increases ERISA Exposure for  Private Equity Funds (Aug. 6, 2013), 
http://www.davispolk.com/sites/default/files/ 08.06.13.Sun_.Capital.pdf; see also Deloitte, 
FIRST CIRCUIT HOLDS PRIVATE EQUITY FUND POTENTIALLY LIABLE FOR PORTFOLIO COMPANY 
PENSION OBLIGATIONS DUE TO TRADE OR BUSINESS ACTIVITY (2013); Christian M. McBurney, 
Private equity funds need not fear tax consequences of Sun Capital, but should they be 
concerned about where the IRS might take it? (Nov. 18, 2013), 
http://www.nixonpeabody.com/files/166177_Private_Equity_Alert_ 18NOV2013.pdf; PwC, 
TAX ALERT: SUN CAPITAL PARTNERS COURT CASE RULING PWC, http://www.pwc.com/ 
us/en/alternative-investment/publications/sun-capital-partners-pension-fund-ruling.jhtml. 
However, there are comments from public sector for supporting the Sun Capital case. See 
Steven M. Rosenthal, Private Equity Is a Business: Sun Capital and Beyond, 140 TAX NOTES 
1459 (2013); Rosenthal, supra note 7. 
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TABLE 3.  CLASSIFICATION OF CROSS-BORDER INVESTMENTS 
 DIRECT CONTROL NONCONTROL 
DIRECT INVESTMENT 
(WITHOUT INTERMEDIARY) 
FDI FPI 
INDIRECT INVESTMENT 
(WITH INTERMEDIARY) 
PEF CIV 
Such a classification certainly simplifies the features of each type of 
investment, because they often overlap with each other to some extent. To be 
specific, although this article distinguishes FII from FPI, FPI has been 
generally used to cover FII, including through both PEFs and CIVs. In 
addition, PEFs have features of both FDI and CIVs.144 The ownership ratio 
of a PEF in the portfolio company is mostly more than 10%, as with FDI.145 
Nor is it clear whether a PEF’s investment should be treated as active or 
passive. On the other hand, PEFs, like CIVs, have typically treated 
themselves as passive investors for tax purposes and not as if they were 
engaged in a “trade or business,” relying in part on two U.S. Supreme Court 
cases.146 In addition, the investment structure used by a PEF resembles that 
used by a CIV, although PEFs tend to have more flexible and complicated 
investment structures than FDI or CIVs, often involving multiple layers of 
pass-through entity and corporate-type special purpose vehicles spread across 
multiple jurisdictions.147 
However, this overlapping does not justify treating PEFs in the same 
way as other types of investment. PEFs are distinguished from FDI by their 
use of an intermediary vehicle. In addition, a PEF’s investment spectrum is 
typically different from that of a CIV, or FPI. Moreover, PEFs, which are 
essentially privately held partnerships, are less transparent to the public than 
 
 144 Kimberly Evans, Foreign Portfolio and Direct Investment: Complementarity, 
Differences, and Integration, OECD GLOB. FORUM INT’L. INV. (2002), 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/inv/investmentfordevelopment/2764407.pdf. Although Evans did not 
distinguish PEF as an independent category from FPI and FDI, she illustrated PEF as an 
overlapping area where the FDI and FPI merge, by arguing as follows: “There is no identifiable 
dividing line between portfolio and direct investment, but only an area of overlap where the 
two merge. For instance, a portfolio investor may be active in the equities market, but equity 
holdings are also one of the main means of direct investment.” 
 145 A recent research study comparing private equity and conglomerates, which represent 
direct investment, also concluded that although private equity firms differ significantly from 
conglomerates, those two share a lot in common. See Cheffins & Armour, supra note 53, at 8, 
39. 
 146 Whipple v. Commissioner, 373 U.S. 193 (1963); Higgins v. Commissioner, 312 U.S. 
212 (1941); see also Rosenthal, supra note 143, at 1462. 
 147 See infra Figure 6. Structure of the Loan Star Fund case. For a basic domestic PEF 
structure, see supra Figure 1. Structure of a Basic Private Equity Investment. 
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FDI, FPI, and/or CIVs,148 and the information is less available even to the 
domestic regulatory agencies because reporting requirements have been 
limited.149 However, if the administrative authorities tried to obtain 
information on the individual investors behind the vehicle, it would be easier 
to do so for PEFs than in CIVs, because PEFs tend to have only a handful of 
high profile investors,150 which rarely change during the lifetime of a fund,151 
while CIVs generally have many more, including private retail investors. 
Therefore, the tax implications of FDI, FPI, CIVs, and PEFs should be 
as different as their economics and business strategies are, and, in particular, 
the international tax rules and policy for each type of investment should 
reflect differences between these mechanisms. In the last decade, public 
finance and tax law literature have started to distinguish FPI and CIVs from 
FDI for the purpose of policy analysis.152 However, little independent 
analysis of PEFs has been conducted,153 which is astonishing given the 
 
 148 Cheffins & Armour, supra note 53, at 5 (arguing that the rise of private equity has 
been controversial in many ways, citing some critics point about counterproductive lack of 
transparency of the private equity as private partnerships). For media criticizing the private 
feature of the big deals done by private equity, see Cheffins & Armour, supra note 53, at 5 
n.21 (citing Eli Noam, Private Equity Is a Problem for Public Media, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 19, 
2007, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/2/50ca3cb0-c01e-11db-995a-
000b5df10621.html#axzz32yhzc5K2; Eli Noam, Invading the privacy of private equity, FIN. 
TIMES, Feb. 24, 2007, http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/2866ab32-c3ac-11db-9047-
000b5df10621.html#axzz32yhzc5K2). 
The lack of transparency in the private equity industry is not limited to international tax issues. 
See TALMOR & VASVARI, supra note 21, at 21 (arguing that because of the private nature of 
the market, “it is extremely challenging for the outsider to understand and form a view on the 
workings of the industry”). 
 149 Sanchirico, supra note 111, at 48. However, the Dodd-Frank Act now imposes 
disclosure requirement on the managers of hedge funds, private equity funds, or venture capital 
funds. See The Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, § 404, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010); see also TALMOR & VASVARI, supra note 21, at 17. 
 150 One can easily imagine thousands of investors in a mutual fund. However, private 
equity firms have made a practice of only seeking investment capital from high profile 
investors, such as pension funds, charitable endowments, and high net-wealth individuals. 
Such practice inhibits access to the private equity from the ordinary private investors. See 
Cheffins & Armour, supra note 53, at 5–6. 
 151 Interest in PEFs is “an intrinsically illiquid asset class” so that partners in PEFs rarely 
change during the lifetime of PEFs. Although the recent development of the secondary market 
for trading interests in PEFs to provide liquidity will give greater complexity, it is still true 
that the change in partners is relatively less common in PEFs than in CIVs. See TALMOR & 
VASVARI, supra note 21, at 187. 
 152 For FPI, see supra note 108. For FDI, see supra note 107. For CIVs, see supra notes 
1163, 116. 
 153 Graetz, supra note 28, at 327 n.254. Extensive studies have been conducted with 
respect to PEFs under the U.S. domestic tax law since 2000, especially concentrating on taxing 
carried interest as either ordinary income or capital gains. See, e.g., Michael S. Knoll, The 
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growth of private equity over the last 20 years.154 
E.  A New Benchmark for PEF Investment 
Given the hybrid nature of PEF investment, the norms of existing 
international tax policy with respect to FDI and/or FPI cannot simply be 
applied to PEFs. The literature on international tax policy with respect to FDI 
is dominated by global welfare benchmark models to advance worldwide 
economic efficiency, or neutrality, such as Capital Export Neutrality (CEN), 
Capital Import Neutrality (CIN), National Neutrality (NN), Capital 
Ownership Neutrality (CON), and National Ownership Neutrality (NON).155 
The literature on FPI also discusses whether the above global welfare 
theory could apply to FDI. For example, Michael Graetz and Itai Grinberg 
argue that neither CEN nor CIN is relevant to the taxation of FPI, whereas 
they recommend NN for FPI to enhance American national well-being over 
the global welfare.156 None have discussed recognizing PEFs’ hybrid nature 
of FDI and FPI. 
More fundamental criticism on the global welfare theory is that the 
international tax neutralities that are standard criteria to evaluate normative 
superiority of international tax policy in the global welfare theory are “not 
appropriate tools for designing tax policy.”157 Each neutrality represents one 
margin of distortion among many, and it is theoretically impossible to satisfy 
the various neutralities at the same time.158 However, the debate concerning 
U.S. international tax policy too often relies on the “single-bullet approach” 
among “alphabet soup.”159 Furthermore, the various neutralities are not 
 
Taxation of Private Equity Carried Interests: Estimating the Revenue Effects of Taxing Profit 
Interests as Ordinary Income, 50 WM. & MARY L. REV. 115 (2008); Adam Lawton, Taxing 
Private Equity Carried Interest Using an Incentive Stock Option Analogy, 121 HARV. L. REV. 
846 (2008); Fleischer, supra note 4; Weisbach, supra note 75. However, few studies are found 
in relation to the international tax. Cf. Kimberly S. Blanchard, Cross-border Tax Problems of 
Investment Funds, 60 TAX LAW. 583 (2007) (including analysis on the private equity 
investment in addition to the mutual funds’ investment). 
 154 TALMOR & VASVARI, supra note 21, at 3 (calling private equity a “new industry” and 
providing that “private equity is responsible for up to a quarter of the global M&A activity 
and as much as half of the leveraged loan issues in the capital markets”). 
 155 See generally Mihir A. Desai & James R. Hines Jr., Evaluating International Tax 
Reform, 56 NAT’L TAX J. 487 (2003); Graetz, supra note 28, at 270–77; Daniel Shaviro, The 
David R. Tillinghast Lecture - The Rising Tax-Electivity of U.S. Corporate Residence, 64 TAX 
L. REV. 377, 386–87 (2010). 
 156 Graetz & Grinberg, supra note 23, at 556–75. 
 157 David A. Weisbach, The Use of Neutralities in International Tax Policy, 68 NATL. 
TAX J. 635 (2015). 
 158 Id. at 640. 
 159 DANIEL N. SHAVIRO, FIXING U.S. INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 14 (2014); Shaviro, 
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directly related to the normative reasons for taxing relevant income.160 
Thus, leaving aside the global welfare theory that does not lead to a 
meaningful benchmark to PEF, this article draws attention to a fundamental 
consensus in international taxation with regard to the active and passive 
distinction, which provides more convincing standard for taxing income 
earned from cross-border transactions. When allocating international tax 
jurisdiction, active business income goes to the source country (where the 
income is produced), and passive or portfolio income goes to the residence 
country (where the income is consumed).161 Such consensus has been 
reached since the development of the modern international tax regime led by 
the League of Nations in 1920s,162 and the League’s 1928 model treaties 
which codified this norm became the basis for more than 2000 bilateral 
treaties throughout the world in addition to the model income tax treaties of 
the OECD, the United Nations, and the United States.163 
Tax scholars have been considering whether such consensus is justified. 
Commentators who argue for a pure residence-based taxation for FPI seem 
to agree with this consensus.164 However, there are commentators who 
disagree with the consensus and argue for shifting the source-based tax 
system on active corporate income to the pure residence-based tax system 
(based on the residence of individual shareholders).165 By applying the global 
welfare theory to evaluate the policy of allocating of tax jurisdiction, some 
proponents of CEN also argue that residence-based taxation is normatively 
superior to source-based taxation.166 While the argument for the pure 
residence-based tax system would be reasonable for the very limited case of 
a passive individual investor,167 it has problems when it comes to FDI or an 
active investment by MNEs. First, it is difficult to determine the residence of 
the business entity that is easily manipulated, or to impute the income to its 
investors because of their complex investment structure.168 Second, the pure 
 
supra note 155, at 386. 
 160 Weisbach, supra note 157, at 648. 
 161 Avi-Yonah, supra note 23, at 1306. 
 162 Id. at 1305–06; Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 23, at 1066–89. 
 163 Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 23, at 1023. 
 164 Avi-Yonah, supra note 23, at 1331–33; Graetz & Grinberg, supra note 23, at 568–74. 
Although Graetz and Grinberg argue that national neutrality policy might be proper for FPI, 
they still borrow that policy to support the residence country’s primary taxing right over the 
FPI. 
 165 See, e.g., Robert A. Green, Future of Source-Based Taxation of the Income of 
Multinational Enterprises, 79 CORNELL L. REV. 18 (1993). 
 166 See Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 23, at 1102. 
 167 Avi-Yonah, supra note 23, at 1311–13. 
 168 Id. at 1313; Shaviro, supra note 155. Although Avi-Yonah and Shaviro discuss the 
electivity of residence by multinational corporations, the same is true for PEFs. PEFs use 
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residence-based tax system will increase revenue for developed countries and 
reduce revenue for developing countries, since the long-standing tax position 
of the former is the country of residence whereas that of the latter is the 
country of source.169 However, the source country will never forgo its taxing 
right on business income produced on its soil.170 Therefore, the current 
consensus on the distinction between active and passive and allocation of tax 
jurisdiction accordingly serves as a reasonable and practical norm in 
international tax. 
The above discussion on the normative superiority of allocating tax 
jurisdiction between source and residence countries suggests a useful 
benchmark for taxing PEFs. The traditional position that PEF is a sub-
category of FPI and subject to residence-based taxation is not justified, 
because it does not accurately reflect the investment nature of PEF, and thus 
does not accord with the fundamental consensus in the international tax 
regime. It also harms the tax neutrality between direct and indirect investment 
in the PEF investment context by improperly allocating tax jurisdiction. 
Given that PEF overlaps with FDI in terms of activeness in business and that 
portfolio companies are often located in developing countries, it would be 
difficult for source countries to yield the entire tax jurisdiction over the 
income arising from PEFs.171 Thus, the new baseline should be that PEF’s 
income arising from the features of FDI or active business activity should be 
subject to the source country’s tax jurisdiction, and income arising from the 
features of FPI or passive investment should be subject to the residence 
country’s tax jurisdiction. 
Therefore, rather than adding another margin for worldwide efficiency 
in the already complicated “alphabet soup,”172 this article proposes an 
incremental reform of PEFs by applying the current consensus in 
international tax more precisely according to PEF’s true nature. The new 
benchmark would contribute to recovering tax neutrality between direct and 
indirect investment by properly allocating tax jurisdiction. It would also be a 
useful tool to evaluate various tax policy alternatives to reforming the 
 
holding companies, which are corporations, so that the discussion can be applied as it is. In 
addition, the issue of residence of partnership in international tax is even more complicated 
than that of corporations. For further discussion, see OECD, R(15). The Application of the 
OECD Model Tax Convention to Partnerships, in MODEL TAX CONVENTION ON INCOME AND 
ON CAPITAL 2010, at 1–98 (2012), http://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/ 
content/chapter/9789264175181-108-en. 
 169 Avi-Yonah, supra note 23, at 1313–14. 
 170 Graetz & O’Hear, supra note 23, at 1103. 
 171 See Avi-Yonah, supra note 23, at 1313 (acknowledging that pure residence-based 
taxation allows more revenue to developed countries and less revenue to developing 
countries). 
 172 SHAVIRO, supra note 159, at 14. 
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taxation of PEF and its partners. Keeping the new benchmark in mind, the 
next part will review recent proposals on carried interest and management 
fees, and relevant cases contributing to the discussion. Their international tax 
implications will be discussed in Part V. 
IV.  CARRIED INTEREST AND BEYOND: ALTERNATIVES TO THE TAXATION 
OF PEFS 
Since the sensational article Two and Twenty: Taxing Partnership 
Profits in Private Equity Funds by Victor Fleischer, which publicized the 
carried interest issue, was first circulated among tax policy groups in 2007,173 
scholars and policy makers have discussed tax loopholes in PEF investment 
and suggested reforms. However, not every proposed reform is based on the 
understanding that PEFs are carrying out active investment or discusses its 
international implications. 
The most popular suggested tax reform for PEFs concerns the tax 
treatment of GPs’ carried interest.174 The agenda has been expanded to GPs’ 
management fees since media coverage describing how little private equity 
firms and their managers pay tax incited discussions during Mitt Romney’s 
presidential campaign in 2011.175 However, those reform proposals are 
limited to GPs’ income. Are LPs not guilty of playing the tax games that GPs 
are playing? They might be, if LPs are taxable. However, most LPs are tax-
exempt, which is the key factor that makes the private equity tax game 
possible.176 Meanwhile, recent cases in the United States and other countries 
open the door for reframing the hybrid nature of PEF investment more 
broadly.177 This Part discusses the proposals and cases as alternatives to the 
taxation of PEF, and envisions the extent to which PEF income should be 
treated as active and passive. 
A.  Proposals on Carried Interest and Management Fees 
A GP’s income consists of three parts. First is the return of its capital 
contribution (as capital interest), typically 1% to 5% of the fund’s entire 
capital.178 Given that a PEF is established as a limited partnership, and that 
it invests in the securities of portfolio companies and then sells them when it 
exits, the fund’s income would be treated as long-term capital gains.179 Such 
 
 173 Fleischer, supra note 4, at 59. 
 174 Burke, supra note 75, at 1−2. 
 175 Polsky, supra note 11, at 10. 
 176 Fleischer, supra note 4, at 13. 
 177 See infra Parts IV.B.2., V.C.2. 
 178 Supra note 57. 
 179 I.R.C. §§ 1221, 1222. From time to time, the funds also earn other types of passive 
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income flows through to partners, including the GP, and the character 
determined at the entity level is transferred to partners as the partnership is a 
pass-through entity.180 
Second is carried interest. Carried interest is in substance a “contingent 
fee for services,” but it is structured as a special allocation of the partnership’s 
profit to the GP.181 Section 707 of the Code provides that a transaction 
between a partner and a partnership by which the partner receives interest in 
profits in return for her services to the partnership would be treated as a bona 
fide partnership transaction, as long as (i) the partner receives it in her 
capacity as a partner and (ii) the payment is not guaranteed (i.e., 
entrepreneurial risk exists).182 Since the GP can receive carried interest once 
the partnership profits reach the hurdle rate of return, current tax law respects 
the carried interest as “a payout of a distributable share of partnership 
income” under section 707.183 Therefore, carried interest is taxed as capital 
gains at a top rate of 20% under current law, which is preferential to ordinary 
income with a top rate of 37%.184 
A number of proposals have suggested reforming the tax treatment of 
carried interest.185 Congressman Sander Levin of Michigan introduced a bill 
to treat carried interest as ordinary income in 2007, but he ultimately dropped 
it.186 Former President Obama also included a proposal for taxing carried 
interest as ordinary income during his presidential campaign in 2008,187 and 
again included the proposed change in his budget proposal for fiscal years 
2010 through 2014.188 However, neither of the Obama Administration’s 
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attempts succeeded.189 
The tide turned in 2015. The proposal to tax carried interest as ordinary 
income had bipartisan support. Former President Obama again included the 
proposal in his 2015 budget,190 and Congressman Dave Camp, Republican 
chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee, also proposed 
reforming the tax treatment of carried interest.191 Tax plans by then-
presidential candidates Hillary Clinton and Donald Trump all endorsed such 
a change during the 2016 election,192 and President Trump continued his plan 
to cut the carried interest tax break.193 Economists estimated that the reform 
will increase billions of tax revenue over ten years, but the estimates varied 
from more than $3 billion over the next ten years194 to $17.4 billion over a 
decade195 and $180 billion over ten years.196 
Nevertheless, the final tax reform bill, also known as the Tax Cuts and 
Jobs Act of 2017, did not successfully close the loophole.197 It introduces a 
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new three-year holding period in order for investment managers to enjoy the 
low capital gains tax rate.198 However, given the fact that the average lifetime 
of a PEF is about ten years, and in many cases PEFs hold investments longer 
than three years,199 many practitioners and commentators expect that the 
reform bill may not effectively close the loophole.200 
Third is the management fee, which is the compensation for the 
managers’ service to the fund. Current tax law taxes management fees as 
compensation for services (i.e., ordinary income).201 Gregg Polsky’s recent 
study addressed the tax planning technique using management fees, expense 
deduction, and monitoring fee offset. Many private equity firms, which 
become a GP or a GP’s affiliates, waive the 2% management fee during the 
formation of the fund in exchange for receiving additional partnership profits 
interest without bearing any entrepreneurial risk, resulting in the conversion 
of ordinary income tax treatment of management fees to capital gains.202 
Allocating all expenses of funds to management fees and pushing down the 
fund’s obligation to pay management fees to portfolio companies by fee 
offset arrangements could also reduce GPs’ income from management fee 
payment.203 In turn, GPs are compensated by receiving more partnership 
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profits, which are taxed at a preferential rate.204 
Governments began to recognize the need to challenge PEFs’ fees and 
expenses. On July 22, 2015, the U.S. Treasury Department and the IRS 
released a proposed regulation under section 707 of the Code, providing that 
if a management fee waiver arrangement lacks “significant entrepreneurial 
risk,” the carried interest received in return for waiving this fee would be 
treated as a disguised payment for services, and taxed as ordinary income.205 
Furthermore, the treasurer of California recently called for legislation to 
make PEFs disclose their fees to investors for full transparency.206 
However, since the conversion of management fees from ordinary 
income into capital gains is available only when carried interest is taxed as 
capital gains, the reforms taxing carried interest as ordinary income could 
prevent exploiting the management fee waiver more fundamentally. 
Therefore, this article includes the reform proposal on management fees as 
part of a broader alternative of taxing carried interest as ordinary income. 
B.  Beyond the Carried Interest: PEF as a Trade or Business 
The reforms discussed in Subpart A only deal with GPs’ activity and 
income. However, a more ambitious position which has impact on both GPs’ 
and LPs’ activity and income has emerged: treating the entire activity of PEF 
as a “trade or business” (ToB). 
Treating PEFs as ToB is in line with recognizing the hybrid nature of 
PEF investment based on the terms of international finance and tax discussed 
in Part III, which notes that despite the passivity in form of using funds as 
with portfolio investment, PEFs in substance acquire more than 10% 
ownership in the portfolio company and then actively manage and monitor 
the operation of the portfolio company. “Trade or business” is a more 
technical term of art used in tax law. It is used many times throughout the 
Code, but neither the Code nor the Treasury Regulations thereunder have 
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defined the term.207 However, it is commonly used to describe a taxpayer’s 
activities to produce income or profits from actively engaging in business, as 
distinguished from a passive endeavor such as holding income-producing 
property.208 The most recent Supreme Court case discussing the ToB is the 
Greotzinger case, where the court held that “to be engaged in a trade or 
business, the taxpayer must be involved in the activity with continuity and 
regularity and . . . the taxpayer’s primary purpose for engaging in the activity 
must be for income or profits.”209 
One of the leading proponents of this position is Steven Rosenthal. 
Rosenthal argues that PEFs are engaged in a ToB for tax purposes, because 
PEFs’ activities of buying, developing, and finally reselling portfolio 
companies are for profits, and these activities are continuous, regular, and 
substantial.210 Rosenthal further asserts that any gains and losses of PEFs 
conducting ToB should be treated as ordinary, not as capital, because assets 
held by PEFs are excluded from the definition of capital assets.211 
1. Capital Gains vs. Ordinary Income 
Can a PEF’s asset be excluded from capital assets? The Code excludes 
from capital assets (1) inventory and (2) property held by the taxpayer for 
sale to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business.212 
Rosenthal’s point is on the latter — a PEF’s assets are for sale to customers 
in the ordinary course of ToB.213 If a PEF is to be treated as ToB, the main 
question is whether the PEF’s assets are for sale “to customers.” 
Many commentators think that the second category of exception to 
capital assets is analogous to the first category (i.e., inventory held by 
merchants or stock dealers), so that investors’ holding assets neither 
constitutes ToB nor sale to customers.214 Thus, investors treat their stock as 
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capital assets. 
On the other hand, Rosenthal argues that the second exception is added 
to deny arbitrary deduction by Wall Street bankers, and that the term “to 
customers” is meant to describe the middleman’s business, not to identify a 
vendee.215 Furthermore, capital assets “must be narrowly applied and its 
exclusions interpreted broadly,” because the preferential rate of capital gains 
is an exception to the usual tax rate.216 He concludes that because PEFs make 
their money from the everyday operation of a business, its income should be 
treated as ordinary.217 
However, it is not clear to what extent Rosenthal would treat a PEF’s 
income as ordinary. In his first article discussing this issue, he seems to target 
only the income of private equity firms (i.e., GPs).218 He refrains from 
applying his theory to tax-exempt LPs and foreign LPs.219 However, in his 
subsequent article on the Sun Capital case,220 which held that a PEF is 
engaged in ToB under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act 
(ERISA), he seems to expand his position, arguing that a PEF’s ToB 
influences an LP’s income portion as well.221 
Whether a PEF’s assets can be excluded from capital assets is still 
controversial. Although Rosenthal argues that a PEF can satisfy the 
requirement of “to customers,” it is not likely accepted by leading tax 
authorities yet. Nonetheless, excluding a PEF’s assets from capital assets and 
treating the entire PEF’s income as ordinary is certainly a policy alternative 
to consider in the spectrum of various alternatives. It could be supported 
further if one would emphasize the active investment nature of PEF and argue 
for a fundamental reform of PEF taxation. 
Rosenthal’s argument that PEFs engage in ToB has drawn attention in 
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the tax policy group, influencing the conclusion of the Sun Capital case by 
the First Circuit.222 Besides the capital assets discussion, PEFs as ToB itself 
has an impact on the tax consequences of LPs. Before discussing how to tax 
LPs of PEFs further, let us examine the Sun Capital case. 
2. The Sun Capital Case 
In 2006, Sun Capital Advisors Inc. (SCAI), a private equity house, 
decided to invest in Scott Brass Inc. (SBI), and acquired the SBI through 
three Sun Capital Funds.223 The Sun GP could receive the well-known “two 
and twenty.” The Sun GP also owned a Management Company (Sun 
Management Co.) that entered into a Service Agreement with SBI to 
provided management services to SBI in exchange for consulting fees. When 
the Sun Management Co. collected consulting fee from the SBI, the 2% 
management fees payable by the Sun Funds to its GP were offset by these 
consulting payments made by SBI (the “fee offset”). 
FIGURE 5.  STRUCTURE OF THE SUN CAPITAL FUND CASE224 
 
The management services were actually provided by the employees of 
SCAI pursuant to an agreement between the Sun Management Co. and SCAI. 
Two to three directors of SBI who were appointed after the Sun Funds 
acquisition were SCAI employees. Other SCAI personnel helped SBI’s 
operation, such as by sending weekly reports to SCAI regarding “[SBI]’s 
revenue streams, key financial data, market activity, sales opportunities, 
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meeting notes, and action items.”225 These SCAI personnel were copied in 
SBI’s email regarding “liquidity, possible mergers, dividend payouts, and 
revenue growth.”226 
In 2008, however, SBI went into bankruptcy and stopped making 
contributions to its pension plan, the New England Teamsters & Trucking 
Industry Pension Fund (Teamsters Plan). As a result, SBI became liable for 
its proportionate share of the Teamster Plan’s unfunded vested liability.227 
The Teamsters Plan asserted that the Sun Capital Funds were jointly and 
severally liable for the SBI’s obligations to the Teamsters Plan under the 
theory that the Sun Capital Funds were engaged in a ToB and they were in 
an ERISA common controlled group with SBI. ERISA did not define ToB or 
common control but directed the Federal Pension Benefit Guaranty 
Corporation (PBGC) to prescribe regulations consistent with Treasury 
Regulations under Code section 414(c). The PGBC promulgated a regulation 
that defined common control as generally 80% or greater common ownership 
by vote or value,228 but neither PBGC nor the Treasury Department has 
promulgated regulations addressing what constitutes a ToB under ERISA or 
the Code. Thus, the main issue was whether the Sun Capital Funds were 
engaged in a ToB. 
In 2012, the U.S. District Court for the District of Massachusetts ruled 
that the Sun Capital Funds were not engaged in a ToB and granted summary 
judgment in their favor. In 2013, however, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 
First Circuit reversed the District Court’s decision, unanimously holding that 
the Sun Capital Funds were engaged in a ToB, and thus were jointly and 
severally liable for the unfunded pension obligations of its portfolio company 
(SBI), based on the theory of “investment plus analysis” by which an 
otherwise passive investment, when coupled with certain activities, could 
cause an investor to be a ToB.229 
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The First Circuit addressed several factors that might satisfy the “plus” 
in the investment plus analysis, including the active involvement of the Sun 
GP in the management and operation of the portfolio company and the fee 
offset arrangement.230 As a matter of fact, the Sun GP actively managed and 
operated SBI. The SCAI personnel monitored even the smallest details of 
SBI, such as signing all checks for SBI and holding frequent meetings with 
senior officers of SBI regarding operation, competition, new products and 
personnel.231 
It is worth noting a couple of implications of the Sun Capital case for 
ToB. First, although the First Circuit’s decision was made for ERISA 
purposes only, the definition of “trade or business” under ERISA refers to 
the definition of section 414(c) of the Code, so that it would not be surprising 
if tax authorities initiated an action to expand the holding to tax cases.232 
Since the term “trade or business” for tax purposes refers to active business 
operations, such an expansion would challenge PEFs’ fundamental tax 
position that they are passive investors. 
Second, the court’s ruling on ToB is not limited to the GP’s activity, but 
applies to the fund itself. Partnership is a pass-through entity, so that the 
partnership does not pay tax and its income flows through to the partners.233 
However, when it comes to determining and computing the items of income, 
gain, loss, deductions, and credits of the partnership, tax law generally treats 
the partnership as an entity to calculate such tax attributes and then has them 
pass through to the partners to pay tax.234 In addition, under the law of 
partnership, partners are agents of the partnership for carrying on the ordinary 
course of the partnership business.235 The general partner is of course an 
agent of a limited partnership.236 Thus, the act of any partner is attributable 
to the partnership as long as the partner’s act is apparently undertaken within 
the scope of the partnership’s ordinary course of business.237 Applying this 
partnership rule to determine ToB, the act of a GP (or agent) on behalf of the 
partnership (or principal) is attributable to the partnership in determining 
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whether the partnership is engaged in a ToB.238 Accordingly, relying on 
Delaware law,239 the First Circuit found that the Sun Funds acted through the 
Sun GP as their agent, and attributed the Sun GP’s ToB activities to the Sun 
Funds.240 Therefore, the fund itself was treated as engaging in the (active) 
ToB (through the activity of the GP,) rather than passively investing in the 
portfolio company. 
As a result, if all of the fund’s profits are treated as arising from the 
fund’s ToB, it would also have an impact on the tax consequences of LPs. 
More broadly, the active and professional investment activities conducted by 
fund managers have implications not only on the taxation of their carried 
interests but also on the overall income of both GPs and LPs. Such active 
business activities of PEFs also have an impact on the international tax 
consequences of the PEF investments, including those of foreign LPs, which 
will be discussed in Part V. The next subpart discusses the domestic tax 
consequences of tax-exempt LPs. 
3. Tax-Exempt LPs and the UBTI Rule 
Under current law, tax-exempt organizations are exempted from 
taxation,241 but their unrelated business taxable income (UBTI) is not 
exempted from taxation.242 More specifically, tax-exempt LPs, such as 
pension funds, have relied on the rule that dividends, interest, royalties, and 
gains or losses from the sale of stock, securities and most other types of assets 
are excluded from the UBTI, so that such income is not subject to tax.243 
However, if the fund is treated as engaging in ToB, the income of tax-
exempt LPs could be treated differently. Capital gains are generally 
exempted from tax, but gains from the sale of property primarily held for sale 
to customers in the ordinary course of the ToB are considered as UBTI, 
subject to tax.244 If a partnership’s ToB generates UBTI to an exempt 
organization that is a partner of a partnership, the exempt organization (or the 
partner) includes its share of the UBTI of the partnership whether or not such 
UBTI is distributed.245 
Traditionally, the PEF’s assets are treated as being held neither for sale 
to customers nor in the course of the ToB.246 However, if PEF investment is 
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determined to be ToB, the issue arises of whether the requirement of “to 
customers” is satisfied, which is identical to the discussion relating to capital 
assets in Subpart B.1. Although the issue is controversial, it is fair to make 
an ambitious argument to exclude PEF assets from capital assets if one 
underscores the active business nature of PEFs. 
More importantly, fundamental policy concerns with regards to tax-
exempt organizations and the UBTI rule should be considered. In fact, tax-
exempt entities are generally viewed positively as providing public goods,247 
so that they are entitled to be exempt from tax on their investment income as 
long as it is not UBTI. Because of the benefits that tax-exempt organizations 
contribute to society, Congress exempts them from tax despite the fact that 
this exemption could cause unfair competition between taxable entities and 
exempt organizations.248 However, Congress added the UBTI rule in 1950 
because it decided that income unrelated to the business of the exempt 
organizations would be presumed not to further their exempt purpose.249 In 
light of that, at least from a policy perspective, whether the tax-exempt LP’s 
income from PEF investment should be exempted or taxable as UBTI should 
be discussed regardless of the technical “to customer” requirement being 
satisfied. 
It is hard to blame taxpayers for wanting to optimize their tax 
consequences as long as it is legitimate under the current law. It could be 
argued that tax-exempt organizations’ investment strategy to avoid UBTI is 
not abusive because it falls within an exception of the tax law.250 However, 
it is unclear whether the tax-exempt entity’s yet undisclosed strategy of 
participating in PEF investments is within the limit of the tax law. First, it is 
doubtful whether their investments through PEFs are entirely passive. If the 
private equity investment is to be treated as active investment as discussed 
above, the tax-exempt entity’s income should be treated as taxable UBTI. 
Second, when their tax-exempt status avails other taxpayers of tax games and 
exploiting the loophole, it should be subject to criticism and reform. Polsky 
has shown that the carried interest loophole exists largely because of the tax-
indifference of the LPs,251 which will be demonstrated in detail in Part VI. In 
addition, other strategies using various fees and expenses have been less 
scrutinized by investors because the investors are less sensitive to the tax 
strategies designed by managers, as long as the managers make sure to make 
 
(criticizing the traditional position to treat the PEFs’ assets as such). 
 247  Daniel Shaviro, Assessing the Contract Failure Explanation for Nonprofit 
Organizations and Their Tax-Exempt Status, 41 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 1001, 1007 (1996). 
 248  Rosenthal, supra note 143, at 1469. 
 249  Id. 
 250  Samuel D. Brunson, Repatriating Tax-exempt Investments: Tax Havens, Blocker 
Corporations, and Unrelated Debt-financed Income, 106 NW. UNIV. L. REV. 225, 242 (2012). 
 251  Polsky, supra note 11, at 3–5. 
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their income non-UBTI. 
Apart from the tax consideration, many tax-exempt LPs have started 
inquiring whether their investment in PEF is desirable or consistent with their 
interests and values.252 For example, pension funds pursue long-term 
stability of their investment strategy, so their investment in PEFs that seek to 
maximize short-term gains would not be desirable.253 Furthermore, the 
complex relationship between GPs and LPs put the LPs “in an asymmetric or 
unequal relationship with [GPs].”254 Thus, some LP organizations, such as 
California Public Employees’ Retirement System, the Wisconsin Investment 
Board, and the New York City pension fund, decided to disinvest in PEFs.255 
While some LPs still prefer to invest in PEFs, a recent survey by Collier 
Capital of 140 LPs suggests that 37% of pension plans and 43% of 
foundations and endowments wanted to decrease their investment in or 
disinvest from PEFs.256 
This attitude of LPs implies that tax-exempt LPs’ investment in PEFs 
would be at odds with their interests and values. If their investments in PEFs 
are undesirable, then there is no longer a legitimate reason to exempt their 
PEF investment income from tax from a policy perspective, given that PEF 
is to be treated as ToB. Therefore, it is worth considering the policy argument 
that tax law should classify the tax-exempt LPs’ investment income from 
PEFs as taxable UBTI. 
If such LPs’ income is treated as UBTI, then how would it be taxed? The 
key question is whether the LPs’ income is capital gains or ordinary income. 
The UBTI rule only determines whether the income is taxable, so that the 
character of income is still subject to the usual partnership tax rule. Under 
current law, because character of partnership gains allocated to partner is 
determined at partnership level, the partnership profits from the acquisition 
and the subsequent sale of the securities in portfolio companies would be 
treated as capital gains for both GPs and LPs.257 However, a more aggressive 
policy alternative discussed in Subpart B.1. treats the PEF as a ToB and thus 
treats GPs’ and LPs’ income as ordinary. 
C.  Summary 
This part specified three policy alternatives to tax PEFs. The proposal to 
tax a GP’s carried interest as ordinary income has gained bipartisan support. 
 
 252   EILEEN APPELBAUM & ROSEMARY BATT, PRIVATE EQUITY AT WORK: WHEN WALL 
STREET MANAGES MAIN STREET 241 (2014). 
 253   Id. 
 254  Id. at 240. 
 255  Id. at 259–60. 
 256  Id. at 259. 
 257   I.R.C. § 702(b); Treas. Reg. § 1.702-1(b) (2017). 
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The second proposal also relates to a GP’s income in connection with 
management fees and expenses. The government has proposed a regulation 
to treat certain carried interest received in return for a fee waiver arrangement 
disguised as payment for services. However, this article suggests that rather 
than pursuing management fee reform separately from carried interest 
reform, it would be better to enact carried interest reform that may encompass 
the management fee issue as well. If the carried interest proposal were 
enacted as law, the carried interest payment from the partnership to a GP 
would be treated as an ordinary deduction to the partnership and ordinary 
income to the GP. 
The third alternative is the most ambitious: to treat the entire activity of 
a PEF as a ToB. Inasmuch as this article demonstrates that the nature of PEF 
investment is active in terms of acquiring at least 10% control of portfolio 
companies, this policy alternative is a reasonable deduction under the law of 
partnership, attributing a GP’s action to the fund. However, it further affects 
an LP’s income, now being earned from an active ToB, which would 
probably make income of tax-exempt LPs as UBTI that is subject to tax. 
Because the LP’s tax-exempt status is the key to making the private equity 
tax game effective, this would be a sensible policy argument. However, 
considering the policy goal to exempt income of such tax-exempt 
organizations for their positive function to provide public goods, policy 
makers should clarify whether Congress still intends to exempt tax or apply 
the UBTI rule for those LPs’ investment in PEFs. 
V.  INTERNATIONAL TAX IMPLICATIONS OF THE ALTERNATIVES 
The policy alternatives discussed in Part IV support the hybrid nature of 
PEF investment. While PEF investment has the form of portfolio investment, 
its substance is more or less active. The difference between the alternatives 
is the extent to which the PEF investment is active. Proposals on carried 
interest limit the extent to which the GP’s income is active, while treating a 
PEF as a ToB ambitiously frames the entire income of the PEF as active. 
The issue of recognizing the active business feature of PEFs in the 
international tax environment has not received much attention from 
international tax experts. The extent of the activeness of PEF investment has 
an impact on allocating tax jurisdictions between source and residence 
countries in the cross-border context. In general, active business income is 
allocated to the source jurisdiction, while passive or portfolio income is 
allocated to the residence jurisdiction by the present consensus in 
international tax.258 The alternatives recognizing the active nature of the PEF 
 
 258  See supra notes 161–63 and accompanying text. 
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investment would push the extant line for source-based taxation.259 
This might raise a question on why we should impose another layer of 
source-based taxation for PEF investment in international tax. I argue that the 
way to justify strengthening source-based taxation on a GP’s income would 
be different from that on an LP’s income, because a GP actively harms 
source-based taxation while an LP connives at the GP’s action at best. Thus, 
to what extent we may strengthen source-based taxation for the PEF’s income 
must be examined. 
Furthermore, considering that developed countries, which are 
traditionally conceived as countries of residence, have led the development 
of international tax norms,260 the developed countries might not be interested 
in recognizing the active nature of PEF investment, which would presumably 
result in the loss of their revenue. However, it would be hasty to presume that 
the revenue effect of alternatives would be as such. Developed countries, 
such as the United States. and those in the European Union, are not 
necessarily the residence countries in PEF investment, as demonstrated in 
Part II. 
The discourse of the nature of PEF investment has already begun, not 
only in developing countries or host countries where portfolio companies are 
located, but also in developed countries, such as the United States, although 
the discourse is still limited to domestic tax issues. It is worth studying this 
issue further in the international context since the Sun Capital case 
recognized the active business feature of PEF in domestic tax 
environment.261 In this part, I present an in-depth analysis of the important 
issues in international tax that the alternative perspective toward PEF 
investment would implicate. Part VI includes a more detailed analysis on 
revenue effects. 
 
 259  My argument is different from that of the group of scholars who try to reformulate the 
consensus in international tax; that is, the series of scholarship discussing the superiority of 
either source or residence as criteria of tax jurisdiction. Some argue in favor of pure residence-
based tax; some emphasize the appeal of source-based tax by criticizing the criteria of 
residence as inappropriate. See supra notes 164–66. However, my approach is distinguished 
from those scholars because I do not directly attack either of the criterions. Instead, I reveal 
the hidden nature of the facts in PEF investment and urge for the application of the extant rule 
more accurately. At the end of the day, my approach would lead to strengthening source-based 
taxation by pushing the line for the benefit of source countries. However, my approach is more 
focused on interpreting the fact rather than evaluating the rule. 
 260  Yariv Brauner, An International Tax Regime in Crystallization, 56 TAX L. REV. 259, 
307 (2003) (providing that developed countries and the OECD have led the international tax 
norms through bilateral tax treaty practice). 
 261  Sun Capital Partners III LP v. New England Teamsters & Trucking Indus. Pension 
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A.  How to Justify Strengthening Source-based Taxation? 
Policy alternatives that recognize the hybrid nature of PEF investments 
could lead to strengthening source-based taxation as opposed to the status 
quo, because the investors’ income would be treated as active income that 
would be taxed primarily by the country of source, rather than as passive 
income that would have been taxed primarily by the country of residence. 
The traditional view that treats the income of PEF investors as passive 
would be rooted in the view that, in addition to the tax consequences of PEFs 
or its investors, takes the corporate tax to be paid by portfolio companies 
located in the host country into account.262 Proponents of this view might 
argue that because portfolio companies have paid corporate tax on their 
profits derived from the active business performed in the host country, profits 
extracted from the investment in portfolio companies — such as capital gains 
when investors sell the stock, and dividends — are passive and thus taxed as 
passive income. These proponents might ask why we should impose another 
layer of source-based taxation on the profits earned by investors solely 
because the fund (or the pass-through vehicle) is arguably treated as active, 
while we already impose source-based taxation on the profits created by 
portfolio companies. 
Such criticism relates to the question of how to justify source-based 
taxation on the fund’s income paid by portfolio companies, and to what 
extent. This subpart examines such justification for GPs’ income and LPs’ 
income in turn, assuming that GPs and LPs are foreigners of the host country. 
1. GP: Manipulating the Fund’s Income and Eroding the Tax Base of 
Portfolio Companies 
Portfolio companies pay two types of returns to PEFs: one is the return 
of labor (i.e., management service) performed by the PEF’s personnel, and 
the other is the return of capital injected by PEFs. A GP receives both types 
of return. From the nontax perspective, a large extent of such income relates 
to the return of labor. Due to tax loopholes, however, carried interest converts 
the return of labor, or ordinary income, into the return of capital, or capital 
gains.263 Such conversion of the return’s character could manipulate the 
source of income in international tax and thus harm source-based taxation in 
the host country.264 
 
 262  I am indebted to Professors Linda Sugin and Jeff Colon for this insight. 
 263  See supra text accompanying notes 181–200. 
 264  More precisely, it is not conclusive whether such manipulation harms the source-
based taxation, because although the primary tax jurisdiction of capital gains is the residence 
country, the primary tax jurisdiction of labor income is not always the source country. More 
details are discussed infra in Subpart B. In brief, the country where the services are performed 
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Furthermore, by waiving the management fee, allocating expenses of 
funds to management fees, and pushing down the funds’ obligation to pay 
management fees to portfolio companies (i.e., fee offset), PEFs strip such 
return to the management function out of the portfolio companies’ profits.265 
The reduced corporate tax base of the portfolio companies as such would 
have been subject to source-based taxation. This is an example of earnings-
stripping in international tax, which is another major strategy to erode source-
based taxation. The United States has taken earnings-stripping seriously and 
tried to restrict it by, for example, adding section 163(j) to the Code as part 
of the Revenue Reconciliation Act of 1989.266 
In other words, we are observing both tax-base stripping and the 
conversion of character simultaneously. On both accounts, GPs are culpable 
for eroding source-based taxation in international tax. Therefore, it justifies 
expanding source-based taxation on GPs’ income by treating the PEF 
investment as active. 
2. LP: Status Enabling the PEF’s Tax Game 
On the LP’s side, the accusation is quite different. An LP’s income is 
purely the return of capital, which is passive investment income unless the 
laws of partnership and partnership tax apply. In international tax, passive 
income of foreign investors, such as capital gains of foreign LPs, are not 
generally taxed by the host country, but it will eventually be taxed (or 
exempted from tax) according to the law of the country where the foreign 
 
has primary tax jurisdiction for the compensation of service. In order not to trigger source 
country’s primary tax jurisdiction on labor income, fund managers try to provide management 
services offshore. However, it is often inevitable to provide the service in the host country if 
the fund managers are actively engaged in the operation of portfolio companies, as shown in 
the Sun Capital case. For those cases, converting the character of GP’s income result in the 
change of primary tax jurisdiction of such income and harm source-based taxation of the host 
country. 
 265  Management fee waiver, expense allocation, and fee offset are GPs’ strategy to 
reduce their compensation paid by the fund and instead to increase their compensation paid by 
portfolio companies. The fund has earned economic benefit because it has saved expenses due 
to the portfolio companies’ payment to GPs and their affiliated management firms, while the 
portfolio companies have suffered economic loss due to such payment. See Berkowitz & 
Duran, supra note 203, at 673–74 (showing that Sun Capital case has noted a direct economic 
benefit of the fund due to the fee offset arrangement). This reduced profits of portfolio 
companies would have constituted corporate tax base that is payable to the source country 
where portfolio companies are located. 
 266  GUSTAFSON ET AL., supra note 208, at 288. For a recent discussion on the earnings-
stripping relating to corporate inversions, see J. Clifton Fleming, Robert J. Peroni & Stephen 
E. Shay, Getting Serious About Cross-Border Earnings Stripping: Establishing an Analytical 
Framework, 93 N.C. L. REV. 673 (2015). 
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investors reside.267 Such nonresident status of foreign LPs is equivalent to a 
domestic LP’s tax-exempt status in terms that both statuses enable the private 
equity tax game conducted by GPs. However, the policy alternatives that 
recognize the hybrid nature of PEF investment would change the primary tax 
jurisdiction of foreign LP’s income from the country of residence to the 
country of source, because if the fund is treated as engaging in active business 
in the host country, both GPs and LPs are treated as engaging in such active 
business, resulting in the foreign LP’s income being subject to the source-
based taxation.268 
Although the entire PEF and its investors (including foreign LPs) would 
be treated as engaging in active ToB under the law of partnership and 
partnership tax,269 LPs are not themselves actively involved in any such 
activities. They do not provide management service to portfolio companies, 
nor do they convert the character of their income or strip the earnings of the 
portfolio companies. The only reason LPs are responsible for the private 
equity tax game is because of their nonresident status availing other taxpayers 
of tax games and exploiting the loopholes. 
In short, foreign LPs are responsible for the private equity tax game not 
because of their actions but because of their status. Specifically, an LP’s 
status relates more strongly to a GP’s converting the character of income, and 
relatively less to the GP’s earnings-stripping. Despite the fact that LPs play 
the tax game, the justification for strengthening source-based taxation of LPs 
would be less convincing considering the LP’s inherent passive nature. 
Furthermore, if such foreign LPs would eventually be taxable in the residence 
country, it would be more or less unreasonable to change the primary tax 
jurisdiction of LP’s income just because of the GP’s action.270 
However, such criticism should first overcome the law of partnership 
and partnership tax law that attributes a GP’s activity to the entire fund.271 
As long as the fund is treated as engaging in active business, income 
attributable to foreign LPs is also active, with the result of expanding source-
based taxation. From a policy perspective, it is fair to argue that international 
tax law should allow residence-based taxation on an LP’s portion of income 
even if the nature of a PEF’s investment is active. However, given that PEF 
 
 267  Needham, supra note 61, at 1219–30. 
 268  See infra Subpart C. 
 269  See supra text accompanying notes 233–40. 
 270  It would be the same even if the LPs are tax-exempt in their home country, because it 
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 271  See Unif. Ltd. P’ship Act § 402 (Unif. Law Comm’n 2013); Johnston v. 
Commissioner, 24 T.C. 920 (1955) (individual partner in Canadian partnership that invested 
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investment is treated as active ToB, it would be difficult for LPs to keep the 
passive nature of their income under current law as long as they take 
advantage of investing in a pass-through vehicle. 
B.  Foreign GPs: Where Are the Services Performed? 
Subparts B and C examine specific international tax issues discussed in 
Subpart A in greater detail. Let us assume a cross-border investment by a 
PEF. In a case of inbound investment, the PEF acquires stocks or securities 
of U.S. corporations,272 and the partners, including the fund manager who is 
a GP, are based in a foreign country. In a case of outbound investment, the 
PEF acquires stocks or securities of foreign corporations, and the partners, 
including the GP fund manager, are based in the United States. The fund 
manager provides management services to the portfolio companies and 
receives a 2% management fee and 20% carried interest from the fund. Under 
current law, carried interest is treated as capital gains of the fund manager, 
while the management fee is considered ordinary income (more specifically 
compensation for services). For discussion purposes, whether the PEF 
constitutes a ToB is ignored for now. 
In a case of inbound investment, if the foreign GP’s income is not 
effectively connected with a U.S. ToB, most of her U.S. source income is 
subject to a 30% flat tax on the gross amount, while her foreign source 
income is not subject to U.S. taxation. Most types of ordinary income other 
than business profits, such as “interest . . . dividends, rents, wages, 
compensations, remunerations, emoluments, and other fixed or determinable 
annual or periodical gains, profits, and income” are subject to such 30% 
tax,273 and collectively referred to as “FDAP income.”274 The Code’s source 
determination rules regarding compensation for services hold that the income 
is sourced where the services are performed.275 Hence, if the foreign GP 
performs management services offshore, such income is not subject to U.S. 
taxation, while if she performs services in the United States, such income is 
subject to U.S. taxation.276 
On the other hand, gains from the sale of U.S. personal property, 
including stock of U.S. corporations (i.e., capital gains), are not treated as 
 
 272  Here, which country the fund has been established does not matter in most cases, 
because the fund is a pass-through entity and does not pay tax. 
 273   I.R.C. §§ 871(a) (nonresident aliens), 881(a) (foreign corporations). 
 274  GUSTAFSON ET AL., supra note 208, at 228. 
 275  I.R.C. §§ 861(a)(3), 862(a)(3). 
 276  If services are performed partly within and partly without the United States, 
compensation will be apportioned between U.S. and foreign sources. Treas. Reg. § 1.861-
4(b)(1)(i) (2005). 
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FDAP income.277 Furthermore, such capital gains realized by a foreign 
person who was not present in the United States for 183 days or more in the 
tax year are not taxed even when they derive from the stock of U.S. 
corporations, because it is likely treated as foreign source.278 
The analysis of the outbound investment is similar. Most countries’ tax 
treaties and laws allocate tax jurisdiction of compensation for services to the 
source country, and that of capital gains to the residence country.279 The 
source of compensation is the jurisdiction where the services are performed, 
while that of capital gains arising from the stock sale is where the taxpayer 
resides. 
Therefore, if the proposals on carried interest to tax compensation as 
ordinary income were enacted as law, the question of where the services are 
performed would necessarily follow. 
Traditionally, fund managers try to perform services in their home 
country and avoid performing services in the host country by not staying 183 
days or more in the host country in a given year.280 This is intended to avoid 
the source rule of compensation for their management fee portion, as well as 
to avoid becoming a tax resident of the host country for their carried interest 
portion. However, it is often inevitable to provide their services in the host 
country if the fund managers are actively engaged in the operation of the 
portfolio companies, in which case both the GP’s management fee and 
carried interest would be subject to the host country’s taxation. 
C.  Foreign LPs 
1. Effectively Connected Income with a Trade or Business 
Let us assume that foreign LPs invest in a PEF, which acquires stocks or 
securities of U.S. corporations.281 When the PEF sells the stocks or securities 
of portfolio companies, capital gains realized by foreign investors are treated 
as passive investment income under current law, so that they are generally 
not taxed even when they derive from the sale of the U.S. corporations’ 
stock.282 In the language of international tax, capital gains realized by the 
PEF and then attributed to foreign LPs are not effectively connected with a 
 
 277  Treas. Reg. § 1.1441-2(b)(2)(i) (2017). 
 278  GUSTAFSON ET AL., supra note 208, at 261 n.1. 
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2018 Carried Interest and Beyond 471 
U.S. ToB, and thus they are not generally taxed.283 That income will 
eventually be taxed according to the tax law of the country where the foreign 
LPs reside. 
However, if such capital gains are effectively connected income (ECI) 
— that is, connected with the conduct of a ToB within the United States — 
they are subject to U.S. taxation at the usual tax rates.284 The term ECI in 
international tax generally refers to the income arising from active business 
activities, or ToB.285 In other words, active business income, or ECI with the 
U.S. ToB, is subject to the U.S. taxation, whereas passive investment income 
is subject to the taxation of the residence country. This U.S. international tax 
rule accords with the active/passive distinction in international tax norms.286 
If the fund is treated as engaging in a ToB within the United States, the 
current tax position of foreign LPs that their capital gains are not ECI would 
be endangered. When a GP’s active management of the portfolio companies 
on behalf of the partnership is attributable to the partnership, the partnership 
is treated as engaging in ToB.287 Furthermore, once the partnership is 
determined to conduct a ToB in the United States, each partner — whether 
LP or GP — is deemed to be engaged in the U.S. ToB.288 Therefore, if a PEF 
is treated as a ToB, foreign LPs would also be treated as conducting a U.S. 
ToB, with the result that their income would be ECI and no longer exempted 
from U.S. taxation. 
However, there is a safe harbor even if an investor is considered to have 
a U.S. ToB. When an “investor” holding stocks and securities is determined 
to have a ToB, such investor usually wants to be treated as a “trader” of stocks 
and securities, which is a slightly more active type of stock holder than an 
investor.289 The Code provides foreign taxpayers with a safe harbor for 
 
 283  GUSTAFSON ET AL., supra note 208, at 261. However, if the foreign person was present 
in the United States for 183 days or more during the taxable year, the capital gains are subject 
to 30% tax. I.R.C. § 871(a)(2). 
 284  I.R.C. § 871(b)(1). Here, the net income, not the gross amount, is subject to tax. To 
explain more technically, gains from the sale of U.S. personal property, including stock of 
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 285  I.R.C. §§ 871(b)(1), 882(a)(1). 
 286  See supra text accompanying notes 127–30. 
 287   See supra text accompanying notes 233–40. 
 288  I.R.C. § 875(a). 
 289   For three classes of stock holders, see supra note 214. Traders’ activities are more 
active than those of investors in terms that they have a ToB, but stocks and securities held by 
both investors and traders are considered as capital assets. Both earn income from the 
472 Virginia Tax Review [Vol.  37:421 
trading stocks or securities (“trading safe harbor”) under which the foreign 
person will not be considered to be engaged in the U.S. ToB.290 
Traditionally, the foreign investors in PEF have asserted that they 
qualify for the trading safe harbor, so that regardless of whether the fund is 
treated as having a U.S. ToB, their investment income from PEF would not 
be ECI and would be exempted from U.S. taxation. However, whether the 
trading safe harbor would protect the investment activities of PEFs is no 
longer certain because of a recent IRS opinion. In January 2015, the IRS 
released a Chief Counsel Advice (CCA) memorandum, which concluded that 
an offshore PEF was engaged in a ToB in the United States as a consequence 
of the fund’s lending and underwriting activities, which were conducted on 
behalf of the offshore fund by a fund manager based in the United States.291 
The CCA memorandum rejected the application of the trading safe harbor 
because it found that the nature of the fund’s business was (active) lending 
and underwriting activities, and that “those activities were neither investment 
activities nor trading in stocks or securities.”292 
The CCA memorandum provides some insight into the overarching 
argument of this article. First, the U.S. tax authorities would be more 
comfortable and ready to recognize in tax cases that the entire PEF would be 
engaging in a U.S. ToB if the GP were involved in active business. Second, 
the type of ToB conducted by the GP and the PEF would be determined by 
the nature of such activity, rather than simply classified as trading stocks or 
securities. 
This case suggests that by recognizing PEF as a ToB, the United States 
could raise its revenue as a source country in the case of inbound investment. 
In contrast, the revenue could decrease in outbound investment cases, where 
the United States would be a residence country. However, the United States 
is the largest destination market of private equity investment, absorbing more 
than 40% of private equity investment worldwide.293 That is, unlike the 
traditional notion that the United States is a country of residence, it is more 
likely a country of source in PEF investments. Thus, the policy alternative of 
treating PEF as a ToB could raise U.S. revenue in the aggregate. These 
 
appreciation of the stock price. Dealers are the most active class of stock holders. They earn 
income not from the appreciated stock, but from the fees or mark-ups in excess of the stock 
price. 
 290  I.R.C. § 864(b)(2)(A)(ii). 
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 293   See supra text accompanying Table 1. 
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revenue effects will be discussed further in Part VI. 
2. Effect of Tax Treaty – Permanent Establishment 
What if there is a tax treaty between the source country where a PEF has 
a ToB and the residence country where LPs reside? Section 894(a)(1) of the 
Code states that the Code applies “to any taxpayer with due regard to any 
treaty obligation of the United States which applies to such taxpayer.”294 
Since most U.S. persons’ cross-border investment and business activities are 
engaged in foreign countries with which the United States has entered into 
bilateral tax treaties, treaty analysis is almost always necessary to complete 
the U.S. international tax analysis.295 
If a foreign taxpayer derives ECI from a U.S. ToB, the net income is 
subject to U.S. taxation at the usual rate. However, tax treaties provide that 
such business income is not subject to the U.S. taxation unless the foreign 
taxpayer carries on the U.S. ToB through a “permanent establishment” (PE) 
to which the income is attributable.296 A PE is defined as a fixed place of 
business through which the business of a foreign enterprise is carried on.297  
Income attributable to a PE is subject to tax in the source country. Thus, 
generally speaking, income attributable to a PE under tax treaties is 
equivalent to ECI for a U.S. ToB under the Code, which describes active 
business income in international tax. With respect to the income not 
effectively connected with a U.S. ToB, the foreign taxpayer is not considered 
to have a PE in the United States.298 
Thus, if a PEF is treated as engaging in U.S. ToB, such income may be 
considered ECI and attributed to the PE in the United States under tax 
 
 294  I.R.C. § 894(a)(1). 
 295  GUSTAFSON ET AL., supra note 208, at 181. 
 296  See, e.g., U.S. Model Income Tax Convention, Feb. 17, 2016, art. 5 (Permanent 
Establishment), 7 (Business Profits). 
 297  Article 5 of the U.S. Model Income Tax Treaty provides that a PE can be found when 
there is a fixed place of business through which the business is carried on. See id. at art. 5(1). 
This includes a place of management, a branch, an office, a factory, a workshop, etc., while it 
excludes such fixed place of business from PE if its overall activities are only preparatory or 
auxiliary. See id. at art. 5(2), (4). 
Furthermore, if an agent in the United States is acting on behalf of a foreign enterprise and has 
and habitually exercises in the United States an authority to conclude contracts that binds on 
the enterprise, that foreign enterprise is deemed to have a PE. In this case, the agent herself 
constitutes a PE of such foreign enterprise even if the agent does not act through a fixed place 
of business. See id. at art. 5(5). However, if the agent is a broker, general commission agent, 
or any other agent of independent state, the agent is not treated as a deemed PE. See id. at art. 
5(6). 
 298   I.R.C. § 894(b). 
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treaties. Then the income flows through to non-U.S. investors,299 making 
them subject to U.S. tax and resulting in less favorable tax consequences for 
foreign LPs.300 However, under the traditional tax position, neither the fund 
nor foreign LPs are considered to earn active business income, which 
impedes further analysis of PE in the cross-border investment by PEFs. 
Nonetheless, the question of whether a PEF conducting cross-border 
investment could have a PE in the source country has been repeatedly 
discussed in tax cases relating to PEF in foreign countries, such as the Loan 
Star Fund case301 and the Standard Chartered Bank case (involving 
Newbridge Capital Group L.L.C.)302 in South Korea. 
 
 299   If a partnership operates a business through a PE, the tax consequences of such 
partnership are generally attributable to partners as if each partner had the PE. Rev. Rul. 90-
80, 1990-2 C.B. 170. 
 300  I.R.C. §§ 871(b), 882; see Rosenthal, supra note 143, at 1469; see also McBurney, 
supra note 143. 
 301  Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2010Du5950, Jan. 27, 2012 (S. Kor.). 
 302  Seoul Administrative Court [Seoul Admin. Ct.], 2008Guhap17110, Dec. 30, 2009, 
aff’d, Seoul High Court [Seoul High Ct.] 2010Nu3826 (2010), rev’d, S. Ct., 2010Du20966 
(2013) (S. Kor.). The permanent establishment issue was discussed at the Seoul Administrative 
Court level. 
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FIGURE 6.  STRUCTURE OF THE LONE STAR FUND CASE303 
 
VI.  REVENUE EFFECTS OF THE ALTERNATIVES 
This Part discusses possible revenue effects when two different 
alternatives to the taxation of PEF apply instead of the status quo, where all 
PEF profits are treated as passive investment income (scenario 1).304 
Recasting carried interest from capital gains into ordinary income as 
compensation is the first representative alternative (scenario 2), and treating 
the PEF’s entire profits — regardless of the GP’s share or LPs’ share — as 
ordinary income arising from ToB is the second representative alternative 
(scenario 3). 
Starting from the domestic revenue effects of the two alternatives, this 
part expands the analysis to the international tax environment to examine 
 
 303  Supreme Court [S. Ct.], 2010Du5950, Jan. 27, 2012 (S. Kor.). 
 304   This Part ignores management fees to simplify the analysis. 
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how the revenue of each country would be affected by each alternative. Since 
multiple fiscs are involved in international tax, it is important to recognize 
which fisc is losing in the international PEF investment. This helps to explain 
the motivation and reaction of relevant countries to the reform alternatives. 
The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 is not likely to change the analysis 
in this Part. As to the domestic analysis, the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 
introduces the three-year holding period for carried interest, which may not 
effectively close the current loophole.305 It further reduces the effective tax 
rates for partnership income by allowing partners to deduct an amount equal 
to 20% of certain qualified business income (QBI) from a ToB conducted by 
a partnership.306 This new deduction only applies to income from a ToB, 
which does not include income earned as an employee or payment for 
services rendered, and phases out if taxable income is above a specific 
amount.307 Since GPs’ income is either paid as an employee or likely to be 
above the specific amount, and LPs are mostly tax-exempt, the new QBI 
deduction appears to be irrelevant.308 
As to the international analysis, the United States was — until recently 
— one of the few OECD countries that used a worldwide system of 
international taxation where a U.S. resident corporation was subject to U.S. 
taxation on all its active income earned abroad or domestically.309 The Tax 
Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 changed the worldwide system to a territorial 
system. Under this international tax system, dividends received by a U.S. 
corporation from foreign subsidiaries in which the U.S. corporation has at 
least a 10% interest are generally exempted from tax.310 However, this so-
 
 305   See supra Part IV.A. 
 306  Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, §11011, 131 Stat. 2054, 2063−71 
(2017) (codified as amended at I.R.C. §199A). 
 307  I.R.C. § 199A(c), (d). For 2018, the QBI deduction starts phasing out if taxable 
income is above $157,500 for a single taxpayer and $315,500 for a married couple filing 
jointly, and phases out in full if taxable income is above $207,500 for a single taxpayer and 
$415,500 for a married couple filing jointly. I.R.C. § 199A(d)(3). 
 308  However, since the eligibility of the new pass-through tax rate is susceptible to tax 
games, there might be a creative way for LPs and GPs to further exploit the new QBI 
deduction, which is beyond the scope of this article. See, e.g., David Kamin et al., The Games 
They Will Play: Tax Games, Roadblocks, and Glitches Under the New Legislation (Dec. 7, 
2017), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3084187.  
 309  In 2015, all but seven OECD countries (Chile, Ireland, Israel, Mexico, Poland, South 
Korea, and the United States) have adopted a territorial system for taxing corporations’ foreign 
active earnings. Rosanne Altshuler et al., Lessons the United States Can Learn from Other 
Countries’ Territorial Systems for Taxing Income of Multinational Corporations, TAX POL’Y 
CTR., URB. INST. & BROOKINGS INST. 10 (Jan. 21, 2015), 
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/UploadedPDF/2000077-lessons-the-us-can-learn-from-
other-countries.pdf. 
 310  Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, §14101, 139 Stat. 2054, 2189−92 
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called participation exemption rule does not apply to dividends received by 
noncorporate taxpayers, such as PEFs and their individual partners.311 
Therefore, it is not likely to matter substantially whether a home country has 
a worldwide tax system or territorial tax system when analyzing the 
international revenue effects of the above three scenarios.312 
A.  Domestic Effects: GP’s Carried Interest and Tax-Exempt LPs 
Current reform proposals on carried interest mostly focus on the GP’s 
activity and the character of its income — capital gains vs. ordinary income 
as compensation. However, it is important to note that, unless LPs are tax-
exempt, converting the character of carried interest only relates to the 
distribution of tax on a given PEF income among LPs and GPs, and does not 
affect the overall revenue.313 In other words, since most LPs are tax-exempt, 
the conversion of ordinary income as compensation into capital gains as 
carried interest results in the loss of revenue. Below is an example 
demonstrating such revenue effects, which is developed from the example 
that Polsky demonstrated in his recent paper.314 
Assume that a private equity fund realizes $100 in capital gains (CG) 
and pays $20 in carried interest to the GP in Scenario 1, where all PEF income 
is treated as passive investment income. Assume further that CG are taxed at 
a 20% rate and ordinary income (OI) is taxed at a 40% rate315 in Country A, 
where all LPs, GP, managers, and the portfolio company (PC) are located. 
Capital loss (CL) can only offset CG, and ordinary deduction (OD) can offset 
OI, so CL can save tax at a 20% rate and OD can save tax at a 40% rate. The 
GP obtains $20 CG (20% of $100), subject to $4 of tax (20% x $20), and the 
 
(2017) (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 245A). 
 311  Factor & Fedida, supra note 10, at 5−6. 
 312  First, the fund is a partnership or pass-through vehicle, so it is not subject to the 
corporate tax system where the distinction between worldwide and territorial matters. Second, 
a substantial portion of investors are tax-exempt entities in their home countries. Third, 
managers who pay tax to home countries are subject to individual income tax, which does not 
differ in either territorial or worldwide tax system. 
 313  Polsky, supra note 11, at 4. 
 314  Id. at 4–5. The numbers of income and losses are the same as the example used in 
Polsky’s paper. However, the revenue analysis with specific tax rate is done by the author. 
Although Polsky argues that by converting the incentive fee to carried interest managers win, 
the investors do not lose because of their tax indifference, and only the fisc loses on an overall, 
net basis, he does not clearly show the revenue effects caused by such conversion, which 
inspires the author to conduct that analysis. 
 315  The example assumes a 40% tax rate based on the top marginal tax rate of 39.6% 
under previous tax law. The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act reduced the top marginal tax rate to 37%, 
effective January 1, 2018. To keep the examples simple, this article continues to assume a 40% 
tax rate for ordinary income and deduction. 
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LP obtains the remaining $80 CG. If LPs are taxable, they are subject to $16 
of tax (20% x $80), and the total revenue would be $20. However, since LPs 
are tax-exempt, LP is not obliged to pay $16 of tax, and the total revenue 
would be only $4. 
In scenario 2, assume the same, but here the fund pays $20 as 
compensation for services to the GP. The GP obtains $20 OI, subject to $8 
of tax (40% x $20). However, the LPs earn $100 CG (100% of $100 profits). 
If LPs are taxable, then they would be subject to $20 of tax on that income 
(20% x $100), but they should pay $20 compensation to GP, resulting in $20 
of OD. Assuming that LPs have plenty of OI from other sources to use the 
entire $20 OD, this OD saves the LPs $8 of tax (40% x $20). The total 
revenue would be the same $20 as in scenario 1. However, since LPs are tax-
exempt, tax consequences of the LPs should be ignored, resulting in $8 of 
total revenue. 
TABLE 4.  REVENUE ANALYSIS (DOMESTIC) 
 GP’s 
income 
GP’s tax 
consequences 
(①) 
LPs’ 
income 
LPs’ tax 
consequences 
(②) 
Total tax 
revenue 
(=① + 
②) 
Scenario 1: 
Carried Interest 
as CG 
$20 
CG 
$4 tax $80 
CG 
LPs are 
tax-
exempt 
-  $4 (③) 
If LPs 
are 
taxable 
$16 
tax 
$20 (④) 
Scenario 2: 
Carried Interest 
as Compensation 
(OI) 
$20 OI $8 tax $100 
CG & 
($20 
OD) 
LPs are 
tax-
exempt 
-  $8 (⑤) 
If LPs 
are 
taxable 
$20 
tax &  
$8 tax 
saving 
$20 (⑥) 
Scenario 3: All 
profits are from 
active business 
income 
$20 OI $8 tax $100 
OI & 
($20 
OD) 
LPs are 
taxable 
$32 
tax 
$40 (⑦) 
 
Comparing scenarios 1 and 2 shows that if the LPs are taxable, then 
changing the character of compensation to carried interest would cause 
different tax consequences for the GP than the LPs. This change benefits the 
GP and harms the LPs, but the total revenue would be the same (compare ④ 
and ⑥). However, if the LP is tax-exempt, tax benefit and detriment do not 
precisely offset each other because of the tax-indifference of the LPs. The 
character swap benefits the GP by reducing tax from $8 to $4, while the LPs 
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are neutral in tax liability due to its tax-indifferent status. Only the revenue 
reduces by the amount that the GP obtains in tax benefits (compare ③ and 
⑤). 
This example shows that the carried interest loophole is substantially 
attributed to the tax-exempt LPs.316 However, the solution of the current 
reform proposals is likely to recast carried interest into ordinary income and 
increase the GP’s tax amount, say from $4 to $8 in the above example. Yet, 
it does not consider whether the role of the LPs and their tax-exempt status 
in the private equity tax game is justified. 
Then, what if PEF is a ToB and all profits are treated as ordinary income 
(scenario 3)? The GP obtains $20 OI, subject to $8 of tax (40% x $20). LPs 
earn $100 OI (100% of $100 profits) and $20 OD, resulting from the $20 
compensation to GP. LPs would no longer be tax-exempt because all PEF 
profits are OI. Therefore, LPs are subject to $32 of tax (40% x $80). 
In addition to the common recovery of the $20 revenue due to the 
recapture of the LP’s income as UBTI, the fisc additionally wins by $12 and 
$16, respectively, compared to scenarios 1 and 2 (compare ③ and ⑦, and 
⑤ and ⑦). The revenue effect in scenario 3 relative to scenarios 1 and 2 is 
much more significant than the difference between scenarios 1 and 2. In sum, 
total revenue is worse off as income arising from PEF investment is treated 
more as passive income, and it is even further worse off compared to the 
hypothetical total revenue where LPs are taxable. 
B.  International Effects 
As to the example in Subpart A, it is fair to say that the overall revenue 
effects rely on the tax policy of Country A, so that the fisc is responsible for 
the loss caused by its own tax policy. It is capable of fixing the system at will. 
On the other hand, in the cross-border investments by PEFs, there are 
multiple fiscs involved, which means that the fisc that allows the carried 
interest loophole and the exemption status of the investors is different from 
the fisc that loses the revenue due to the PEF tax policy. 
To compare the above three scenarios in the international domain, 
assume now that all LPs are tax-exempt entities located in Country A, while 
the PC is located in Country B. The GP and the fund managers are also 
residents of Country A, but they conduct the investment activities, including 
their service at the board of the PC, in Country B. There is a tax treaty 
between Countries A and B, whereby capital gains are taxed by the residence 
country or home country only, and compensation for service or employment 
is taxed by the country where the service or employment is exercised. Both 
countries tax CG at a 20% rate and OI at a 40% rate. Assuming that LPs have 
 
 316  Polsky, supra note 11, at 5. 
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plenty of OI from other sources to use the entire $20 OD, the OD saves the 
LPs $8 of tax (40% x $20). 
TABLE 5.  REVENUE ANALYSIS (INTERNATIONAL) 
 Income subject to 
Country A’s 
Taxation 
(Residence 
Country) 
Revenu
e of 
Countr
y A 
(①) 
Income 
subject 
to 
Countr
y B’s 
Taxatio
n 
(Source 
Countr
y) 
Revenu
e of 
Countr
y B 
(②) 
Total 
worldwi
de 
revenue 
(=①+
②) 
Scenario 1: 
Carried 
Interest as 
CG 
(All profits 
are passive 
income) 
LPs 
are 
tax-
exem
pt 
GP: $20 carried 
interest (CG) $4 
tax 
LPs: $80 CGno 
tax 
$4 
(③) 
No 
income,  
no tax 
 
 
0 (④) $4 (⑤) 
If LPs 
are 
taxabl
e 
GP: $20 CG  $4 
tax 
LPs: $80 CG  
$16 tax 
$20 
(⑥) 
No 
income,  
no tax 
0 (⑦) $20 (⑧) 
Scenario 2: 
Carried 
interest as 
Compensati
on (OI) 
LPs 
are 
tax-
exem
pt 
LPs: $100 CG & 
$20 OD  
no tax 
0 (⑨)  GP: 
$20 
OI$8 
tax 
 
$8 
(⑩) 
$8 (⑪) 
If LPs 
are 
taxabl
e 
LPs: $100 CG & 
$20 OD  
 $12 tax 
$12 
(⑫) 
GP: 
$20 
OI$8 
tax 
 
$8 
(⑬) 
$20 (⑭) 
Scenario 3: 
All profits 
are from 
active 
business 
income 
LPs 
are 
taxabl
e 
No income,  
no tax  
0 (⑮) GP: 
$20 OI 
 $8 
tax 
LP: 
$80 OI 
 $32 
tax 
$40 
(⑯) 
$40 (⑰) 
 
In the first scenario, where all profits are treated as capital gains derived 
from passive investment, Country B does not collect any revenue from this 
investment. Country A would collect $20 tax from this investment if the LPs 
were taxable ($16 tax from the income of LPs and $4 tax from carried 
interest), but it can only collect $4 from carried interest. 
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In the second scenario, where carried interest is treated as ordinary 
income for services, Country B can collect $8 tax from carried interest. 
However, Country A does not collect any tax from the income of the tax-
exempt LP, while it could collect $12 tax if the LPs were taxable and had 
plenty of OI from other sources to use the entire $20 OD. 
In the third scenario, where all profits of the PEF are active business 
income, Country A does not collect any tax, while Country B exercises 
primary tax jurisdiction on all income from this active business and collects 
$40 in tax revenue. 
Country A (the home country) is losing more revenue as more income 
arising from private equity investment is treated as active or ordinary income 
(compare ③, ⑨, and ⑮), while Country B (the host country) is losing more 
revenue as more income arising from private equity investment is treated as 
passive investment income (compare ⑯, ⑩, and ④). However, both 
countries’ tax benefits and detriments do not offset each other because of the 
tax-indifference of the LPs. For example, while Country B would gain $8 
more revenue by moving from scenario 1 to 2, Country A would lose only $4 
of revenue (compare ⑩ and ③). 
In addition, total worldwide revenue is also worse off as income arising 
from private equity investment is treated more as passive income (compare 
⑰, ⑪, and ⑤). It is even further worse off when compared to the 
hypothetical worldwide revenue where LPs are taxable (compare ⑧ and ⑤, 
and ⑭ and ⑪). 
As such, the issue of fiscs losing in the private equity tax game becomes 
more complicated in the international domain. If it were a single jurisdiction 
case in Subpart A, the relevant government may control whether it would fix 
the policy or endure the revenue loss for the sake of other policy goals, such 
as promoting exempt organizations or attracting more foreign investment. 
However, in the international domain, the government pursuing such other 
policy goals is different from the government suffering from the resulting 
revenue loss. Furthermore, because of the tax-indifferent investors, a home 
country is less susceptible to the private equity tax games, while a host 
country is more susceptible to them. This phenomenon is not limited to the 
issues of the character of carried interest or the active/passive nature of 
private equity investment. The monitoring fee offset, interest deductions, and 
debt push-downs to PCs also harm the revenue of host countries, whereas the 
home countries are less susceptible as long as the LPs are tax-indifferent. 
Whether the alternatives to the PEF taxation would negatively affect the 
U.S. tax revenue is not certain. Some would prefer the status quo in scenario 
1 if they consider the United States as the traditional country of residence as 
shown in Figure 6. 
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FIGURE 6.  GPS’ JURISDICTIONS AND EMERGING MARKET LPS’ 
JURISDICTIONS317 
 
However, it would be hasty to presume the revenue loss of the United 
States, because it is necessary to take into account bilateral cashflows in order 
to determine the precise revenue effect. In fact, developed countries are major 
source countries as well as major residence countries in the PEF industry. 
Figure 7 shows the rank of source countries where international PEF 
investments are deployed. Advanced economies, such as the United States 
and the United Kingdom, are dominant source countries in PEF 
investment.318 Hence, the precise revenue effect of any given country is 
theoretically indeterminate, to the extent that a country, like the United 
States, is simultaneously acting as a residence and source country. 
 
 317  This chart was created using Table 1 and Figures 3 and 4. 
 318   The United States is the largest destination market, absorbing 41% of private 
investment worldwide, followed by the United Kingdom and non-U.K. Europe. See text 
accompanying supra note 82, Table 1. 
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FIGURE 7.  DESTINATION MARKET (SOURCE COUNTRIES)319 
 
This Subpart has conducted a numerical exercise on a marginal revenue 
effect among relevant countries. This article further urges experts to conduct 
empirical studies on the macroeconomic revenue effects of the PEF tax 
reform by incorporating data on bilateral cash flows. The result is 
theoretically ambiguous. However, because traditional residence countries 
with advanced economies are source countries at the same time, it is expected 
that determining the true nature of PEF investments and reforming PEF tax 
accordingly would increase worldwide revenue without significantly 
reducing the revenue of traditional residence countries. 
More fundamentally, scenarios 2 or 3 are normatively superior in light 
of international tax theory. These alternatives allocate tax jurisdiction more 
accurately than the status quo because they envisage the nature of PEF 
investment more squarely in the cross-border context. However, the policy 
choice between scenarios 2 and 3 would not be simple, due to the conflicting 
policy goals for LPs. In that regard, the tax effect analysis in this subpart 
provides a guideline for the government to perform revenue cost analysis of 
those alternatives. 
 
 319  This chart was created using data from Table 1. 
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VII.  CONCLUSION 
PEF investment has been treated as a passive portfolio investment 
despite the fact that it acquires at least 10% equity of portfolio companies, 
which is seemingly active. The true nature of PEF investment is in fact 
hybrid: a PEF seeks to acquire control over portfolio companies, just like 
active direct investment does, while it uses a pass-through vehicle subject to 
partnership tax, thereby taking the form of passive investment. 
The goal of partnership tax is to achieve tax neutrality between direct 
and indirect investment by not imposing entity-level taxation. Current tax law 
on PEFs does not perfectly accomplish this tax neutrality because a PEF 
converts the active business income into passive investment income. 
However, the flaws could be cured by modifying the partnership tax rule 
applicable to PEFs, both domestically and internationally, to reflect the 
nature of the PEF more precisely. Finding the true nature of PEF investment 
and reforming PEF tax accordingly would not reduce the revenue of 
traditional residence countries, but it would significantly increase the revenue 
of source countries. Thus, the overall worldwide revenue would be expected 
to increase. 
Given that a pass-through tax regime is the normatively proper system 
for taxing PEFs, the discussion of reform in this article envisions two 
simplified model environments: a single jurisdiction for domestic tax 
analysis and bilateral jurisdictions for international tax analysis. International 
tax norms and treaties that allocate tax jurisdiction according to active and 
passive distinction are also bilateral solutions. In reality, however, most 
cross-border investment by PEFs involves at least three countries, not two — 
(1) a residence country (or home country) where investors are located, (2) a 
source country (or host country) where portfolio companies are located, and 
(3) an intermediary jurisdiction where investment vehicles (and particularly 
holding companies) are located. Since the alternatives in this article are still 
confined to the bilateral model, further research of the problem in the context 
of the multinational environment is needed to propose a more comprehensive 
and effective reform. 
 
